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This work addresses two important issues of investing through asset man-
agers: similarities in the investment philosophies of low cost funds and share
restrictions of hedge funds.
For the low cost funds, I create a framework to reveal their investment
philosophies and study the resulting predictability of the aggregate fund trad-
ing actions. First, I develop a new methodology, which, using discrete trading
observations, quantifies the fund’s preferences towards available factors and
their values. The approach enables us to classify quantitative factors into ”Ac-
tion” or ”Attention” types. The latter is used to identify whether the fund is
using a given factor to make trading actions or merely as a filter to concentrate
its attention on a subset of stocks. I apply the model on the US mutual fund
holdings data and find that 82.7% of the US mutual funds have a significant
preference towards certain factor regions. For the funds which existed in the
period from 1994(q1)-2014(q4), 6-month momentum is the most popular ”Ac-
tion” factor (used by 28% of the funds). Whereas, the most popular ”Attention”
factors are turnover and size (used by 43 and 36% of the funds respectively). I
find that a fund’s preference towards a factor value might change depending
on the quantities of other factors. In particular, within different factor deciles
(clusters), fund’s preferences towards the same factor might be completely op-
posite to each other. After, I create a theoretical model, where agents follow
pre-defined investment philosophies and make trading decisions based on the
changes in the underlying ”Attention” and ”Action” factors. The model is de-
veloped to work in a framework where funds have a finite-dimensional source
of public information. I adjust the model for possible trading style changes and
use it to predict the next quarter trades for each fund. I aggregate those pre-
dictions to test the model on the US mutual fund holdings data. I find that
for stocks with large institutional holdings, the change of the holdings between
adjacent quarters can be predicted with the model. The results provide evi-
dence against the commonly accepted hypothesis which states that the mutual
fund herding happens because the funds follow each other’s trades. The Action
|Attention model provides an alternative explanation, where an ”unintentional
herding” happens because of the similarities of the trading philosophies of the
low-cost funds.
For Hedge Funds, I create a framework of optimal portfolio construction
that can incorporate the costs of re-balancing constraints and share restrictions.
I do that by transforming a constrained portfolio construction problem into an
unconstrained one by penalizing the expected returns of the underlying as-
sets. The methodology is applied to computing the lockup premium of hedge
funds in Markov-Switching and transaction cost frameworks. In contrast to the
approaches I find in academia, I argue that the hedge fund lockup illiquidity
should be modeled as a lost investment opportunity premium. I compute the
premium for an experimental data set.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I begin by informally describing my motivation to analyze the trading
philosophies and the share restrictions of the investment funds. After a gen-
eral discussion of the topic1, the further organization of the thesis chapters is
presented.
1.1 The Choice of the Research Topic
The question of modeling the illiquidity premium of hedge funds first came to
my attention during a class project2. I continued exploring the idea beyond the
class and became interested in analyzing asset managers in general. The re-
search soon became quite mathematical and at some point I had to take a break
from it to learn more about the stochastic optimal control theory. In addition
to academic and news sources, I was fortunate to get a better understanding of
the financial industry through various informal conversations with asset man-
agers themselves. Academic and industry conferences also helped me to gain
intuition in the subject.
The impression which was forming on my side was that there were two im-
portant concerns in the modern asset management industry. First, some of the
trading strategies did not work as well as they did before. So, the funds were
interested to know how crowded their strategies were and whether there might
1More formal introductions of the research topics are given in the first sections of the follow-
ing chapters.
2I worked on the project together with Andrey Gushchin and Ksenia (Trikoz) Verdiyan. The
idea to explore the aforementioned topic came through an informal conversation with Nathan
Chesley from MITIMCo. Class: ORIE 5610 (Spring, 2014), Instructor: James Renegar.
1
have been some structural changes in the market which made famous anoma-
lies no longer profitable. Second, funds seemed to be worried about the investor
outflows and the demands for lowering the management fees. As a result, I be-
came interested to explore the balance between the higher fees and the trading
restrictions on one side and the possible similarities in the trading strategies
on the other. Through various discussions with my adviser, I formulated the
research topic I explore in this thesis.
1.2 Thesis Background
Financial services is a highly competitive industry which in the last decades
rapidly integrated knowledge from various disciplines to generate profits. Tech-
nological advances provided affordable and fast access to financial data for the
majority of the market and created the computational capacities to process it.
The market became more systematic and model-driven, demanding a higher ra-
tio of trained professionals to make successful investment choices. This, in turn,
increased the number of sophisticated investment companies and the amount of
money they manage. A large portion of the modern equity market is managed
by investment professionals as a part of an investment fund. Different types of
funds have their comparative advantages and making a choice between them
is not trivial. Lower fee funds, such as mutual funds and ETFs, have transpar-
ent structure but follow simpler trading strategies which often correlate with
each other. Hedge Funds, on the other hand, might have more sophisticated,
high-return strategies, but could also impose liquidation constraints. The main
problem of a typical institutional investor is to optimally allocate and manage
its portfolio through asset managers. In such scenarios, the use of the classical
2
portfolio construction models is often impractical, due to the incompatibility
of the simplifying assumptions with the reality. Specifically, in a portfolio of
Hedge Funds it is not possible to frequently re-balance assets and re-balancing
weights might be associated with a certain set of rules and significant costs. On
the other hand, the common trading strategies of mutual funds might also re-
sult in hidden correlations and unaccounted risks. This thesis is concerned with
exploring the aforementioned two issues of investing through asset managers.
The first question we ask ourselves is how increasing sophistication of the
industry could possibly generate similarities in the trading approaches? At
the first sight, the reverse statement might sound more logical, because sophis-
tication should also result in new methods and more diversity. I start the dis-
cussion by presenting an informal background on the topic.
Ad-Hoc Methods and Favorite Models: During the last decades the investment
industry became more sophisticated, which resulted in an increased demand for
trained investment professionals. The higher educational institutions prolifer-
ated the number of specialized programs to train individuals for work in the
investment companies. The curriculum in those programs became systematic
and the students across those programs are introduced to classical models and
beliefs of how markets work. Academic consensus on the financial market it-
self evolved through different phases. In 1970s it was widely thought that the
stock prices are ”random”, which was later formalized into the Efficient Market
Hypothesis. However, starting from 1980s the academic literature on anomalies
came into light, which concluded that markets are not completely efficient and
there might be mispricings and limited arbitrage opportunities3. Since then,
3For a more detailed introduction into the subject, I refer the reader to the Chapter 1 of the
Book by Qian, Hua and Sorensen [1]
3
various other models were proposed from purely behavioral, to mathematical
or statistical ones. As the complexity of new financial models started to increase,
they became harder to understand and their average acceptance rate started to
slow down. Increasing mental efforts are needed to understand a new intricate
concept, and to explain it to a non-sophisticated investor might be even more
difficult. On the contrary, tweaking or changing an old trusted model could be
more favorable.
As a result, a handful of models (e.g. CAPM, APT) and trading styles (e.g.
Momentum, Value) became absolute favorites and a large ratio of the market
started to use their variations. These are wide-spread in industry, are actively
taught in specialized programs in the universities and some of them have been
around for decades. Many of those models/strategies were discovered in the
era when the trades were not automatically executed or when the computa-
tional capacities of computers were quite modest. More importantly, at the time
they were discovered they were not so widely used. However, the question
whether there are enough similarities in the models to make the aggregate fund
actions predictable still remains open. The first chapter of this thesis is devoted
to exploring the aforementioned question.
1.3 Thesis Organization Summary
Chapter 2 discusses the topic of the fund trade predictability for the low-cost
funds. In the section 2.1, a formal introduction on the topic of common trading
philosophies is given. After describing the input data in the section 2.2, I present
the methodology of quantifying the preferences of the funds in the section 2.3.
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I introduce the concept of Action and Attention factors and apply the model on
the US mutual fund holdings data in the sections 2.3.5 and 2.3.6. In section 2.3.7
I analyze the overlapping signals from the different factors and introduce the
”preference directionality maps”. Next, in the section 2.4 I construct a theoreti-
cal framework of an agent who trades based on the changes in the Action and
Attention information. Section 2.5 completes the chapter, where I present the
results of fitting the Action|Attention model to the data.
Chapter 3 introduces a framework to compute the premium of a trading re-
striction and Chapter 4 applies it to measure the lockup premiums of the hedge
funds. I model the hedge fund lockup premiums in the Markov-Switching and
the Transaction-Cost frameworks in the section 4.2. The results of computing
the hedge fund lockups for an index data set is presented in the section 4.3.
The conclusions of Chapters 2-4 are presented in the Chapter 5, where I also
discuss the possible limitations and further improvements of the results.
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CHAPTER 2
PREDICTABILITY OF FUNDS FOLLOWING COMMON INVESTMENT
PHILOSOPHIES
2.1 Introduction
A large portion of the market is currently managed by investment professionals
as a part of an investment fund such as a mutual fund, hedge fund or an ETF.
In the US alone, in 2014 there were approximately 8000 registered mutual funds
that manage around 16 trillion USD, which is a 16-fold increase compared to
1990s [2]. Fund managers often follow a certain trading philosophy and search
for asset pricing anomalies using various factors. As a result, funds share beliefs
on which factor values could help an equity to outperform a certain benchmark.
Those beliefs might be quite general in nature, e.g. ”low P/B stocks would out-
perform the market” or ”stock price has a momentum but eventually reverses
to the mean”. An interesting question is how closely funds follow their invest-
ment mandates and whether keeping dear to an investment philosophy makes
their trading decisions predictable. For example, suppose it is possible to quan-
tify into factors all the sources of the information which a fund uses for trading.
Then, would there be most (least) ”favorite regions” of factor values where the
funds is most (least) likely to buy or sell an equity? In this work, I quantify the
preferences of the funds towards company-level factors and discuss how those
preferences affect the aggregate fund trade predictability.
Trading philosophies of most of the funds are not kept in secret and funds
usually advertise their trading philosophies in prospectuses to attract investors.
That information is even mentioned in the fund names. For example, a quick
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textual analysis of our database shows that out of approximately 7000 US mu-
tual fund1 names the words ”growth”, ”value” and ”cap” were mentioned in
17%, 12% and 21% of them, respectively. There are a few popular empirical ap-
proaches of classifying a fund’s trading style. For example, Grinblatt, Timan &
Wermers (1995) divide the mutual funds into two categories: contrarian (buy-
ing stocks which performed poorly in the past) and momentum (buying the past
winners). The authors find that 77% of the funds in their database are momen-
tum investors. Another well-accepted approach to measure fund’s trading style
is based on the work of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman & Wemers (1997). The method
is to classify each stock into quintiles according to book-to-market, market capi-
talization and past momentum return characteristics. After, for each fund, using
the fund’s portfolio holdings, a style benchmark is formed. Those approaches
are fundamentally different from ours, mainly because they were designed to
analyze mutual fund performance. Investment research companies such as
Morningstar® or Thomson Reuters Lipper ® also classify funds based on hold-
ings and the classification of stocks into (usually 3) styles (see [3] and [4]).
Although those approaches might be useful for understanding the exposure of
a mutual fund towards different risk factors, their design does not explicitly
measure fund’s buying and selling (i.e. trading) preferences. In a hypothetical
example, suppose we have a successful value fund which bought stocks with
low price to book ratios and sold them after one year, when the price to book
(P/B) ratios of the selected stocks became high. The holding measure would not
quantify such a behavior as pure value trading, since the P/B ratios of stocks be-
came high before they were liquidated and that would be counted as a ”growth”
signal.
1The funds are mainly mutual funds and ETFs. For the funds which changed their names I
only use the most recent available name. More information on the database will follow.
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On contrary to those approaches, I only study the trading actions made by
the fund in relation to the underlying information in the market. I analyze Buy
and Sell decisions separately and comparing them to each other reveals whether
the factor is used within the trading philosophy of the fund. I do that by first se-
lecting and quantifying the input information (input measure) and fund’s trad-
ing actions (output measure) as to account for possible sources of noise. Later,
I accumulate the signals in a way to account for fund reporting delays and to
extract directionality of preference. I also introduce and later test the concept of
the ”Action” and ”Attention” factors. I briefly describe those steps, below.
Action and Attention Factors: Due to computational limitations, it is natural
to assume that fund managers pay attention only to a subset of securities and
make trading actions (e.g. Buy, Sell) based on a subset of available information.
Hence, if we quantify the available public information into a large number of
factors, then for a given fund some of the factors are used to guide the attention
towards a subset of securities whereas others might be the reason of a fund’s
trading decision. For example, if we have a ”small-cap momentum” fund, then
the ”size” factor’s quantity would guide the investor’s attention towards a sub-
set of assets. However, the trading decision of the fund would not be to buy the
equity with the smallest ”size”, but within the small-cap funds will depend on
”momentum” and possibly some other factors. In such a case, ”size” would be
an attention factor, whereas ”momentum” would be an action factor. Another
logical attention factor might be the quantification of security’s industry.
Quantifying Trading Actions (Output Observation Measure): A Fund’s Buy
and Sell decisions in their pure form do not necessarily reflect the fund’s trad-
ing philosophy or style. For example, relatively small Buy and Sell changes in
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the portfolio might be a simple risk adjustment rather than a signal of ”like” or
”dislike”. Also, a homogeneous increase (decrease) in the existing equity posi-
tions of the fund might be a result of a large inflow (outflow). I apply filters to a
fund’s trading decisions to adjust for inflows/outflows, risk-adjustment noises
and extract the fund’s main trading preferences. For that reason, I create 4 out-
put observation (trading) measures. The main output measure I will use in the
first part of my research is made by dividing the fund’s amount of Buy (Sell)
of a given stock by the total amount of Buy (Sell) of the fund in that quarter.
So, if we have a large inflow/outflow or a risk-adjustment trading observation,
its importance would be reduced by the designed measure. Based on a similar
logic, I create two other output measures and use them for robustness checks.
Quantifying Information (Input Observation Measure): To analyze the abso-
lute preference towards a single source of information, I complement the 69
company-level factors from WRDS Financial Ratios suite by 11 quantitative in-
vestment signals presented in Jagadeesh, Kim, Krische & Lee (2004) and in Wer-
mers, Yao & Zhao (2012). Many of those factors are made by combining and
comparing (both within the cross-section and time-series) signals from com-
pany and market data. To make the factors for different stocks comparable to
each other in current and previous time periods, I assign to a factor’s quantity
a combined cross-sectional (market-cap weighted) rank. The latter quantifies
a factor from a decision-maker’s perspective and helps to mitigate the system-
atic differences of the factor values between the industries. More details on the
methodology is given in the section 2.3.3.
I make the factor rankings market-cap weighted so that there is no bias, i.e.
so that the relations between the input (factors) and the output (Buy/Sell quan-
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tifications) for a ”no-preference” investing are random. I test it by constructing
a ”no-directionality” trader from the market data and observe a completely ran-
dom relation. However, when I apply the model to actual funds, I see that they
have distinct Buy and Sell directionality patterns. I call those preference pat-
terns the 1-dimensional directionality curves. To analyze the preference pattern
in a larger number of funds, I systematically classify the preferences into sim-
ple curves. I apply the method on our fund holdings database to extract the
funds’ trading philosophies. As a result, for each fund I am able to classify the
available factors into ”Action”, ”Attention” or ”Indifference” types.
After, I discuss the question of possible overlap of the input information.
For example, in one-dimensional analysis it is not clear which factor’s move-
ment was the reason of the fund trading. I propose a simple method of finding
preference towards one factor by clustering the trades for which all the other
factors were close to each other. I find that in different factor regions, fund’s di-
rectionality of preference might have different shapes. Because of that, I extend
our analysis into multiple dimensions and create preferences depending from
multiple factors. I call those directionality maps.
Next, I create a theoretical model where agents use action and attention fac-
tors to make trading decisions. I define decision functions for each fund and
by fitting them to the data, reconstruct its expectations numerically. The fit-
ting process is implemented in a moving window of a fixed length to account
for possible trading style changes. The reason is that there might be a lot of
variability on how closely a fund follows its investment mandate and trading
strategies which use different trading styles (e.g. style-rotation strategy1) are
not uncommon. Although style-rotation type of strategies gain popularity, the
1For a theoretical treatment of style investing see Barberis and Shleifer (2003).
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non-rotating trading styles are still plentiful in the market. Besides, according to
Brown, Harlow & Zhang (2015), on average the funds with lower levels of style
volatility still outperform the style-volatile funds. One of the main assumptions
in our model is the assumption on all the information being public. Accessing
the information might still have both computational and monetary costs associ-
ated with it. But, I assume that the markets are fair and there is no ”completely
private” information which certain funds are using to trade on.
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2.2 Data Sources and Filtering
Before discussing the concept of directionality of preference, I start by present-
ing the data sources that I am using for testing the models. The reason is to be
able to present some results and test robustness of our model while describing
it.
Aggregating Mutual Fund Holding Data: Thomson Reuters s12 (former CDA
Spectrum) is probably the most commonly used database for analyzing the
holdings of the mutual funds in the academic literature. It contains both vol-
untary and some of the SEC mandated portfolios available through the forms
N-30B-2, N-30D, N-Q, N-CSRS, N-CSR and N-Q ( [5], [6]). In addition, the
Thomson s12 database contains portfolio holdings information before 09/1993
which is not included in the EDGAR system ( [4], [5]). Because the Thomson s12
database structure is widely used in academia, to ease reproducibility, I collect
data into a database following a similar structure and terminology2. I combine
FactSet Unadjusted Fund Holding data (1999q1-2014q4, [7]) with CRSP fund
holding data (2009q1-2014q4, [8]). I also implement a textual analysis of SEC
filings (https://www.sec.gov/edgar/) and compare it with the fund and se-
curity names from CRSP for (1994q1-2014q4). As a result, our data partially
spans 1994-1998 and then fully covers 1999-2014 mutual fund holdings. An in-
depth comparison of the CRSP, Thomson s12 databases and the SEC filings is
presented in the works of Schwarz and Potter (2014).
Combining Data from Various Databases The information about the funds
and the stocks themselves I extract from the CRSPSift and the CRSP databases
2I was not able to use the Thomson s12 database itself since Cornell University was no more
subscribed to the Thomson s12 database through WRDS, hence I had no access to the recent s12
data.
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( [9], [8]). Compustat [10], IBES [11] and the Financial Ratios Suite by WRDS [12]
are used for constructing relevant factors. I link the fund holding and the CRSP
databases using fund names (which I control for changes and possible varia-
tions). I use the methodology described in MFLINKS manual [6] and Appendix
A of Wermers (1999), to remove possible repetitions and mistakes. Throughout
the databases, I link all the stock headers (including the Compustat GVKEY [10]
headers) to PERMNO header of the CRSP. As a result, a permanent identifier of
a stock in our database is PERMNO and of a fund is FUNDNO. The figure de-
scribing the process is attached, below:
Figure 2.1: Linking Fund Holdings, CRSP and COMPUSTAT
Stale Data: Multiple file dates (FDATE) for the same report date (RDATE) of
a fund often indicates repeating holding entries, so I remove them from the
data and leave only the ones with the smallest FDATE. The procedure elimi-
nates around 6 million out of the 34 million {fund, asset, holding} entries in
our database. For the rest of the data, in the majority of the cases the FDATE
and RDATE are in the same quarter. I remove the data for which the difference
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between FDATE and RDATE is more than 2 quarters.
Figure 2.2: Number of quarters in between FDATE and RDATE
Share and Price Adjustment Factors from CRSP: To compare the number of
the outstanding shares and prices during different time periods, I adjust them
for the share distributions. CRSP ( [9]) has two factors which I use: facprc and
facshr. For a given stock j and months m1 < m2 we define:
AdjSj(m1,m2) = (1 + facshrj(m1 + 1))...(1 + facshrj(m2)) (2.1)
AdjPj(m1,m2) = 1/((1 + facprcj(m1 + 1))...(1 + facprcj(m2))) (2.2)
From where, we can calculate the share holdings and price changes in the fol-
lowing way:
ShrChange = SHROUTj(m2)− SHROUTj(m1) ∗AdjSj(m1,m2) (2.3)
PrcChange = PRCj(m2)− PRCj(m1) ∗AdjPj(m1,m2) (2.4)
Implementing Share Distribution Adjustments: To determine whether the
fund bought new shares of the securities, it is important to account for share
distributions. In some of the filings, holdings adjustments are already made
for the stock splits, stock distributions, M&As and other corporate events. In
those cases, I implement additional adjustments as described in the figure 2.3.
R(t), F (t) are the RDATE and FDATE for the quarter’s holdings report and t′
indicates the preceding report of the fund. First, I adjust shares from F (t′) to
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F (t) and calculate the adjusted difference between the shares. Next, I also ad-
just the share difference back to R(t), i.e. the date closer to when the actual fund
trading took place.
Figure 2.3: Distribution Adjustments: Example
Constructing the Matrix of Holdings and Changes: In other words, I record the
share changes from the previous report’s time to the time t quarter in the time
R(t) shares. Let us denote the adjusted share holdings variable by AHoldings
and the share change by Changesk,j(t). Based on the aforementioned, we get
that:
AHoldingsk,j(t) = Holdingsk,j/AdjSj(R,F ); (2.5)
Changesk,j(t) = AHoldingsk,j(t)−AHoldingsk,j(t′) ∗AdjSj(R′, R). (2.6)
Large Reporting Gaps: I also make a logical vector iRepk(t), which will indicate
whether fund a k has a valid report with a RDATE in the quarter t. To reduce
the noise in our data, I will calculate holding changes for a fund k at the time t
only if the gap between the previous valid report date is at most 2 quarters. So,
I construct a matrix iPrevRepk(t) to record the last valid report date if it is less
than 3 quarters away. For the first entry of a fund, iPrevRepk(t) would be the
preceding quarter. It is easy to see that the following equation holds:
iPrevRepk(t) = (t− 1)iRepk(t− 1) + (t− 2)iRepk(t− 2)¬iRepk(t− 1)+ (2.7)
+ (t− 3)iRepk(t− 3)¬iRepk(t− 1)¬iRepk(t− 2) (2.8)
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Based on the existence of valid iPrevRep, I adjust the variable Changes so only
the cases with a valid previous reports remain.
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2.3 The Directionality of Preference
The aim of this chapter is to give a heuristic description of a model, which was
designed to measure the preferences of a fund towards a source of information.
The underlying data is assumed to be the set of the infrequent observations
of the fund holdings, as is the quarterly Mutual Fund holdings data. I start
by describing the set of available information the traders have access to in our
model.
The Information Set: There exists a finite but potentially very large number d of
factors f1, ..., fd, describing each asset. Those factors could include, for example,
stock-specific financial ratios, macroeconomic data, analyst reviews or even a
quantifications of news-sentiment. Also, the factors could be relational in the
sense that a ranking of an asset based on another factor could be a factor itself.
Time is continuous but the information updates at discrete instances. That is, a
given stock at a time t has factor i value vi(t), where vi(t) is piece-wise constant.
Observations: For a given fund, suppose we have a finite number N of trading
observations:
Oi = {ti, si, Vi, Ai}, (2.9)
where ti is the time of the trading action of the fund towards the stock si, which
has factor values Vi = {vi1, ..., vid}. Ai is the dollar amount of Buy/Sell trade and
represents the action of the fund towards the stock. We will call {ti, si, Vi} to be
the input observations and Ai the output observations. Based on the observa-
tion data, our goal is to explore whether there is some preference in the funds
towards the specific factors and their values. The observation data in its raw
form could be very noisy, because an absolute quantity of a factor value without
17
comparisons is incomplete from the decision-maker’s point of view. Also, the
observations do not accommodate for inflows/outflows to the fund, fire sales
and external factors.
Figure 2.4: Trading Observation Modeling Steps
Thus, I design input observation measures to filter signals which are impor-
tant for the funds and an output measure which will quantify the interest of the
fund in a stock. The workflow of the trading observation modeling is presented
in the figure 2.4. In the following part of this section, I will talk about choosing
a subset of information and designing input/output measure µI/µO. But first, I
will introduce and formally define the concept of directionality of preference.
2.3.1 Types of Directionality: Attention and Action
We want to explore the question whether there is any directionality in the in-
vestor’s preference towards a given factor value. That is, if we have two stocks
with all except one factor being identical, would the investor prefer buying stock
1 over stock 2 based on the value of that single factor? The answer probably is
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that it depends on the factor itself and in some cases the investor would be in-
different between the two options.
One can note that, similar to the revealed preference problems, we have in-
put and output observations from the decision maker. However, the main dif-
ference here is that a factor value cannot be considered as a ”good”. That is, if in
the preference theory, the more of a specific good we have the better it is, here
the larger values might not imply more preference. So, more complex prefer-
ence relations could exist (as in the figure 2.5), which are impossible to model
by a simple utility function. To address the issue, I will divide the set of all of
the factors into three categories: Attention, Action and Indifference.
Figure 2.5: Directionality of Preference
Differentiating Between Factors (Action and Attention):
Due to computational limitations, it is natural to assume that the fund managers
pay attention only to a subset of securities and make trading actions (e.g. Buy,
Sell) based on a subset of the available information. Hence, if we quantify the
available public information into a large number of factors, then for a given fund
some of the factors are used to guide its attention towards a subset of securities,
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whereas others could be the triggers of a fund’s trading actions. Based on the
aforementioned intuition, I give the heuristic definitions of the attention, action
and indifference factors.
Definition 2.3.1 (Attention Factor). For a given investor, a factor fi is an attention
factor, if there exists a fixed interval such that:
1) the investor considers buying (selling) the asset only if the value of the factor is in
that interval
2) investor is ”indifferent” towards the factor’s value while within the interval
Definition 2.3.2 (Action Factor). For a given investor, a factor fi is an action factor,
if:
1) the investor’s decision to Buy & Sell is affected by the value of the factor
2) there is a value of the factor which investor considers to be the best for buying the
asset
Definition 2.3.3 (Indifference Factor). For a given investor, a factor fi is an indiffer-
ence factor, if the investor’s trading decisions are not (in any significant way) dependent
on the value of the factor
An example of an attention factor could be the factor describing the market cap
size of a stock. A fund might decide to invest only in the small caps. However,
the trading decision of the fund would not be to buy the equity with the smallest
”size”, but to make the choices between the small cap companies based on some
other factor(s). So, if the stock is in the ”attention region”, it could have a higher
chance of being both Bought and Sold. As a result, the ”attention shape” is
likely to be described by opposite Buy and Sell preference curves (e.g. see the
Type 3 section of the figure 2.6).
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An obvious example of an action factor could be the momentum signal for cer-
tain funds. For example, if we have a ”small-cap momentum” fund, then the
”size” factor’s quantity would guide the investor’s attention towards a subset
of assets. However, the trading decisions of the fund within the small-cap stocks
will depend on the ”momentum” factor. In such a case, the ”size” would be an
attention factor whereas the ”momentum” would be an action factor.
Based on our definitions, we would expect the relation between the Buy/Sell
signals and the stock factor values be represented by shapes similar to the ones
in the figure 2.6 (green dots represent the hypothetical Buy observations and the
red dots the hypothetical Sell observations).
Figure 2.6: The Directionality of Preference
Buy vs. Sell signals: To understand which of the output observations reveal the
investor’s trading philosophy, I discuss a few possible scenarios. A small Buy
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could be a sign of a re-balancing or hedging, whereas a larger Buy probably
means that the investor’s trading philosophy is in favor of the stock. Similarly,
a ”new Buy” (i.e. the case when the investor did not hold the stock in the pre-
vious quarter) could represent a ”like”, though a ”Buy more” (i.e. increasing
a position in an asset) could be a result of an inflow. However, a Sell decision
might represent a larger variety of scenarios. It could be the case that for a long
time the stock did not perform as the investor was expecting, and the investor’s
decision to liquidate its position does not reflect their core investment philoso-
phy. So, although a Buy is often a planned action, a Sell could be a result of a
forced decision. Thus, to untangle the underlying trading philosophy of a fund,
I would analyze the buys and sells separately.
Standard Directionality: Based on the aforementioned, I define a few direction-
ality patterns which we would expect the funds to have. The preference could
be absolute, or there could be peaks where the fund thinks Buying/Selling is
optimal. The first two simple patterns we would expect to have are I-shaped
and V -shaped (when there is a peak either towards Buy or Sell). But, a trading
strategy might be more complex, so we might also have behaviors with 2-peaks
or 3-peaks as are the N and M -shaped patterns. For simplicity I would consider
those patterns and their ”smooth” versions (see 2.7).
Next, we are able to give our first definition of an investment philosophy. I
define an investment philosophy to be the set of directionality graphs for Buy
and Sell actions
Corollary 2.3.1 (Indistinguishable Investment Philosophies). Two funds have the
same investment philosophies, if their simple directionality graphs are of the same type
for all of the factors.
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Figure 2.7: Standard Types of the Preference Shapes: IVNM
The definitions and the intuition developed in this section will be used in the
next two sections to reconstruct the investment philosophies of the funds in our
database.
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2.3.2 Output Observation Measure
Our aim is to quantify the Buy/Sell actions of a fund in a way to compare the
fund’s preferences towards different stocks. However, a raw dollar quantity Ai
of the amount of the stock buy/sell does not account for the fund’s overall size,
the inflows/outflows in a given quarter or the fund’s average trading amount.
To account for large inflows/outflows or fire selling, we can divide the value
Ai by the total dollar amount of the trades in a given quarter. The idea is to
make the trading action values independent from the seasonality of the trading
volume. I call the resulting output transformation to be the Output Measure 1.
Output Measure 1: Buy (Sell) divided by the total amount of (Buy+Sell) in a
given quarter
µ1O(Ai) =
Ai∑
j|tj=ti |Aj|
(2.10)
The Output Measure 1, however, could introduce a bias in the case when in
a given quarter the fund was mainly buying stocks or mainly selling them. For
example, if there were many outflows in the fund and the total dollar amount of
the sold stocks is large, then a significant Buy order in the same quarter would
also be ”unfairly” quantified to a smaller value. To resolve the aforementioned
issue, I introduce two more output measures.
Output Measure 2: Buy (Sell) divided by the total amount of Buy (Sell) in a
given quarter
µ2O(Ai) =
Ai∑
j|tj=ti |Aj|IAjAi>0
(2.11)
Output Measure 3: Buy (Sell) divided by the average Buy (Sell) of the fund up
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to the current quarter
µ3O(Ai) =
Ai∑
j|tj≤ti |Aj|IAjAi>0
(2.12)
For robustness tests, we could also record the relative difference between the
quantity of the Buy and the Sell action signals.
Output Measure 0:
µ0O(Ai) =
IAi>0 − IAi<0∑
j|tj=ti IAjAi>0
(2.13)
The measure I will be using for the 1-dimensional preference analysis is the
Output Measure 2. This measure is quite robust, and the measures 0 and 3
output similar preference results in the 1-dimensional case. However, to be able
to predict the next quarter fund trading, I also introduce a measure which is
dependent on the past holding of a fund.
Output Measure 4: Buy (Sell) divided by the previous report’s total amount of
holding (in shares) in a given stock.
Note that this only applies to the cases when the fund bought more of the stock
or sold the stock. That is, it requires that the fund held the stock in the previous
quarter, else we will be dividing by zero.
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2.3.3 Input Observation Measure
In this section I will discuss the question of selecting and quantifying a subset
of available information for our further analysis.
Selecting an Information Subset
There are hundreds of financial factors and ratios available in the industry and
it is not easy to know which ones a fund pays more attention to. Traders might
have different sets of financial information they look at, but including too many
factors in our model is certainly not practical. With the help of the Financial
Ratio’s Suite by WRDS alone we have access to 71 different firm level ratios (see
[13]). Those are the most commonly used ratios in the academic research. A
quick analysis by averaging (where applicable) the correlations of factors over
all the stocks shows that many of those factors are significantly correlated.
Figure 2.8: Correlations within the Factors
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Since many of the factors are correlated, we don’t need to consider all of them
at once and can choose a subset. Also, many factors are constructed by using
other factors. So, to better understand and model the financial information, first
I will try to represent the financial ratios as a combination of information and
its transformations.
If we fix a time and only look at one stock, then the stock usually has a parent
company and is traded in the market (see figure 2.9). There is some information
about the company: e.g. its profitability, debt amount, etc. The company is in
an economy and also is probably a part of some industry. From the market,
I assume that the only signals are the price of the stock and the transaction
data. In its plain form, I assume there are no opinions and all the information is
uniquely quantifiable.
Figure 2.9: The Sources of Plain Information
Next, there are transformations such as comparisons and combinations (CO)
which we can apply to our information. The comparisons could be both cross-
sectional (CS) and historical (TS). Combinations in our model are assumed to
be simple algebraic actions as fractions and comparisons. I assume that all in-
formation is a result of CS/TS comparisons and combinations on the plain in-
formation. For example, by using CO and CS on the price, the transaction and
the market data, we can get many financial factors as described in the figures,
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below.
Figure 2.10: Transformations of the Information
Figure 2.11: Choosing the Main Factors
In addition, we could have also performed analysis as PCA to choose combina-
tions of those ratios which explain the most variance across all the 71 factors.
Alternatively, one could cluster the factors into groups based on the inverse of
the correlation value. However, to overcome possible issues of overfitting, I
will choose the initial set of factors qualitatively. The WRDS factors are divided
into 8 groups: Valuation, Solvency, Profitability, Financial Soundness, Liquid-
ity, Efficiency, Capitalization and Other. In addition, we also construct factors
representing: Momentum and Size indicators of a stock.
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Quantifying the Information
Since I consider stocks by looking at their factor values, it is important to make
the factors comparable to each other. As a result, we cannot keep the raw nu-
merical quantity of a factor as our input component. From a decision-making
perspective, I differentiate the following two classifications of a factor value: its
rank in comparison to other securities (CS) and its rank in comparison to its
own value in the previous time-periods (TS).
Figure 2.12: Factor Value: Decision-Maker’s Perspective
Cross-Sectional ranking of stocks by a factor value is a popular way of sorting
stocks and is used both in industry and in academia. An important question
while making a cross-sectional ranking is choosing the set within which the
ranking will be performed. Before addressing that question, I will discuss how
to rank the stocks in any subset so as to not introduce a bias.
Ranking (Cap-Weighted vs. Equal-Weighted): For all of the factors, their rank-
ings will be in the fixed interval [1, 10], where 1 would represent the smallest
factor value in the subset. A straightforward way of choosing a subset to rank
the stocks is to choose the exchange where it is listed. I will discuss more on the
topic of the subset selection, but first let us discuss the ranking process. Sup-
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pose we have a stock and have already selected a subset of stocks which we
would like to compare it against. The naive way to rank the stocks’ factor val-
ues, would be to sort them and give equally spaced ranks in [1, 10], based on
their order statistic. However, that might create a bias, since on average the
market is invested in a company proportional to its market cap. As a result,
companies with large caps would receive more action quantities than small cap
companies for the same input factors. To resolve the issue, I will assign ranks
to the stocks proportional to their market cap. I will discuss the topic in more
details in the next section.
Cross-Sectional Ranking: CS
The first obvious choice to rank the factors is to perform it cross-sectionally
within all the stocks under consideration. I will first perform the ranking within
the stocks which have at least 10 institutional holders.
Within-Industry Cross-Sectional Ranking: CSI
Due to peculiarities of some industries, it is also important to rank the stocks
within each industry. Besides, some funds only concentrate on stocks within
a given industry and CSI ranking might help in such a case to measure the
relative change of the factor. I use the 10 industries as presented in Kacperczyk
et al. (2005). In addition, I also perform a rolling Time-Series (TS) window
ranking of the stock to measure how the stock’s factor performs in comparison
to its past. The TS ranking might also be implicitly taken into account in the CS
ranking, assuming there were no extreme market events. Another possibility is
ranking in comparison to funds’ portfolio holdings (CSH). Again, that ranking
2Note that the CS ranking here has no connection with the Characteristic Timing (CS) mea-
sure developed by DGTW (1997)
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is implicitly included in the CS ranking.
Combining Rankings: CS & CSI & TS
As we discussed, the rankings themselves could be performed within all securi-
ties in the market, an exchange or even within a given fund’s or style’s interest
set. Considering all of those options in our analysis would multiply the amount
of factors by 3-5 times and is not practical. Next, I define 3 input measures,
below:
Input Measure 1:
µ1I(V ) = CS(V ) (2.14)
Input Measure 2:
µ2I(V ) = 0.5 ∗ CS(V ) + 0.5 ∗ CSI(V ) (2.15)
Input Measure 3:
µ3I(V ) = 0.5 ∗ CS(v) + 0.3 ∗ CSI(v) + 0.2 ∗ TS(v) (2.16)
For simplicity and for taking into account both the CS and the industry rank-
ings, I will use the Measure 2 as the main one for our further analysis. I will
keep the other two measures for possible robustness checks.
Initial Choice of the Factors
For the ease of presentation, I start the analysis with 8 sources of information
(factors). Those are bm (book to market ratio), pcf (price to cash flow), pe exi
(price to earnings, diluted, excluding EI), roe (return on equity), cash ratio (cash
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ratio), debt ebidta (total debt over EBITDA), size (natural log of the market cap-
italization divided by 1000) and mom (6-month price momentum). All except
the last two were retrieved from the Financial Ratios Suite by WRDS. For fur-
ther description of the factors I kindly refer the reader to the WRDS manual
(see [13]). The momentum factor (also the 3 and 12-month momentum) was
constructed as presented in Bali, Engle and Murray (2016, [14]).
Additional factors are constructed based on the appendix of the article by Wer-
mers et al. (2012, see [15]) which are also examined by Jegadeesh et al. (2004,
see [16]). Those are size (natural log of the market capitalization divided by
1000), turn (average daily volume turnover), sue (standardized unexpected
earnings) and frev (analyst forecast revision to price)3.
In addition to the factors above, for the later sections I will also add the factors
ptb (price to book ratio) and divyield (dividend yield). For the 1-dimensional
factor research I will also apply our analysis to the rest ≈ 60 factors from the
Financial Ratios Suite by WRDS.
3The construction of the factors mom, turn, frev and sue were implemented by my student
research assistant Gregory Stepaniouk, during the summer of 2016.
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Figure 2.13: Example: Combining Observations
2.3.4 Combining Observations
After we processed the input and output observations, we need to combine
them. First, note that in our model the observations of holdings are infrequent.
So, we might have a few factor value changes in between two holdings observa-
tions. For example, if the holdings observations are quarterly but factors change
monthly, then it is not clear due to which of the 3 month’s factors the fund made
the trade. Besides, we also need to account for the frequency of the observations
in a given factor region. For example, if there are many Buy observations near
factor value 10 and only 1, but large, Buy observation near factor value 1, then
it is likely that the Buy observation at 1 is an outlier or at least not how usually
the fund trades. Because of that, we need to combine the observation data in a
different way.
A frequently used method for data smoothing and noise reduction is the mov-
ing average filter. However, it cannot be applied in our case since the distribu-
tion of factor values for the observations might not be uniform. For example, in
an observation data as in the figure 2.13, a moving average filter with 5 entries
will give large values to the infrequent small observations in the middle.
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The smoothing technique I propose would solve the issues described above.
Size of the action measure and the number of the actions are both important.
I assume an error bound on the recorded factor values for the trades. Let us
denote the bound by f . For each observation and each factor, I combine it with
the observations within f distance from the factor. I use sum instead of average
so that the number of observations also counts. I exclude the outliers on the left-
most and right-most of the region, where it is not possible to put an interval with
length f . Otherwise, on the left-most and the right-most values of the factor, we
would have smaller values just because of the method of construction. I discuss
the possible choices of f later in the thesis. So, for now I allow the observations
to have a fixed small error bound.
Figure 2.14: Intuition of the Data Smoothing
There are two questions under consideration here: the likelihood of an action
and the size of an action. What we do here by summing up is combining those
together and in that case we have a strong signal.
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The only problem with this approach is that some of the funds would have
many more observation quarters than the others, so the combined action mea-
sure would be larger for funds with more observations. One way to resolve this
would be to scale the resulting value by the number of the observation quarters
of each fund.
No-Directionality (ND) Trader: So, we have selected a subset of factors and de-
signed input/output observation measures and a framework to combine those
observations. Next, I go back to the question of the distribution of the actual
input observation measure. In our framework, I define the No-Directionality
Trader to be the one who does not have any preference towards any of the fac-
tors. The ND Trader has a large amount of money and each time period re-
invests all of it randomly in the market. We can think of it as if the ND Trader
buys the fraction of the market each time. In that scenario, the amount of money
invested in each stock would be proportional to the market capitalization of it.
Alternatively, we could have defined the mutual fund ND Trader to be the one
who invests proportional to the total mutual fund holding of a stock. However,
in that case the information would be biased in case if mutual funds in aggregate
have some preferences towards a given factor.
35
Results: Directionality Curve of the ND-Trader
I check for a relation between the factor value measure and the action of the
ND-Trader for 8 factors and stocks in the US markets. I chose a random subset
of years: 1997-1998, 2004q1-2004q2 and 2010-2014. For those time periods, I use
the market data on the factors and compute the directionality relation of the
ND-Trader in different scenarios.
We can see in 2.15 (left side) that an Equal-Weighted ranking of the factors
provides biased results for all of the factors in each of the 3 time intervals. We
can see that the longer the interval the more biased the results are. However,
using the cap-weighted ranking, the directionality of input/output observation
is close to a random noise (right side of the figure 2.15).
In addition, I used smoothing with square root or log of the cap size for the
robustness comparisons. As I have expected, neither of those make ”pure noise”
for the ND-trader, which confirms the intuition of making all the rankings cap-
weighted. Thus, cap weighted ranking produces no directionality for a fund
with preferences that are matching with the market. Next, I test the individual
mutual fund directionality versus the ND-Trader.
2.3.5 Assessing the Absolute Directionality
As we have discussed in the previous section, to avoid biased results I adopt
market-cap weighted ranking. I search for directionality on a few randomly se-
lected funds. I compare the funds in our database versus the ND-Trader (which
had a random ”noise” form). The analysis is first performed towards a ran-
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Figure 2.15: ND Trader, (left) Equal-Weighted and (right) Cap-Weighted
Ranking
Horizontal Axis: µeq/capi (fac), Vertical Axis: ”Like/Dislike Measure” for µ
2
o(Buy) (Expected
amount of the Buy/Sell trading fraction in an f = 0.3 region of a point).
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domly selected Growth (see figure 2.16) and Value fund (see figure 2.17).
Figure 2.16: Accessor Funds: Growth Portfolio (Buy Signals)
Horizontal Axis: µcapi (fac), Vertical Axis: ”Like/Dislike Measure” for µ
2
o(Buy) (Expected
amount of the Buy/Sell trading fraction in an f = 0.3 region of a point).
As we could see, both of the funds have ”smooth-looking” directionalities to-
wards many factors. Moreover, the growth fund seems to Buy high momentum
stocks and the value fund low book to market ratio stocks. Both of those ob-
servations are in line with the funds’ names. However, if we look at Buy and
Sell decisions combined (see figure 2.18), we would see that many of the factors
with a clean buy directionality pattern have exactly opposite sell directionality
pattern. I classified those type of factors as Attention Factors. For the growth
fund, though, we could see that the momentum factor is the only one that has
both Buy and Sell directionality patterns similar which results in Buy/Sell de-
cisions combined having a directionality. In our terminology, the momentum
factor would be classified as an Action Factor for that fund. The Value and
Income Fund, as we saw, purchases stocks which are value, but the way the
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Figure 2.17: Accessor Funds: Value and Income Portfolio (Buy Signals)
Horizontal Axis: µeqi (fac), Vertical Axis: ”Like/Dislike Measure” for µ
2
o(Buy) (Expected
amount of the Buy/Sell trading fraction in an f = 0.3 region of a point).
fund sells the stocks nullifies the value effect. For that fund, also all except the
momentum factor are clearly attention factors. The fund’s strategy could be to
Buy above-average and below-average momentum stocks and sell when those
return to average momentum values.
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Figure 2.18: Directionality of Buy, Sell and Combined Actions
Accessor Funds: Growth Portfolio (All Signals)
2.3.6 IVNM Fitting
Our aim is to find the simplest curve that would fit the data. The IVNM curves
have 0-3 inflection points and I would start fitting I, then V then N and then
M with a fixed statistical significance. The problem with V, N and M fitting is
correctly identifying the inflection points of the curve. By default, I assume that
I is the increasing line and V, N, M lines are similar to their letter representations.
I will denote the flipped up-down versions of I, V, N, M by I’, V’, N’, M’.
The IVNM Fitting Process
As we have discussed previously, we want to fit a curve as simple as possible.
However, funds might have more complex trading strategies and V , N or M -
like patterns are not necessarily an overfitting. For both Buy and Sell signals and
their combination, I start by implementing a linear regression, that is fitting the
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I-curve. Next, to maintain a balance between the simplicity and the goodness
of fit, I define adjusted R-squared acceptance levels as follows:
• IadjR2 ≥ 0.75 (Linear Regression)
• VadjR2 ≥ 0.80 (2nd degree polynomial or 1-dimensional Gaussian)
• NadjR2 ≥ 0.90 (3rd degree polynomial)
• MadjR2 ≥ 0.95 (4th degree polynomial)
If the requirement is satisfied by a simpler curve, then I move to a more com-
plex one only if the improvement in the adjusted R-squared value is greater
than 3/4. The reason we are considering both the 2nd degree polynomial and
the Gaussian function is that the latter also has a V-shape and is likely to repre-
sent the actions of an investor. In particular, if an investor is not interested in a
region, then the B/S signals are probably flat there. The 1-dimensional Gaussian
(ae−(x−b)2/2c2) curve has exactly those properties with flat-looking tails.
Applying the IVNM fit to the fund described in the previous section, I get the
figure 2.19.
Results: Buy/Sell Directionalities of the US Funds
As I have previously mentioned, I will only consider funds which have at least
50 buy/sell actions recorded. Implementing the aforementioned methodology
on our fund database for years 1994-2014, I get that around the 82.7% (see figure
2.20) of the funds have a Buy or Sell directionality towards at least one out of
the 16 factors.
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Figure 2.19: IVNM fit of the Directionality of Buy, Sell and Combined Ac-
tions
Accessor Funds: Growth Portfolio (All Signals)
Figure 2.20: IVNM Buy/Sell Curve Fitting Statistics
The N and M shapes, as we expected resulted in a very few cases of the funds.
On average, the N and M directionality shapes were recorded for the 0.5% of
the funds with the largest number being 3.3%. For I and V shapes the results
are presented in the figure 2.21. We can note some obvious similarities of pref-
erences from the table. For example, we see that 18% of the funds use bm factor
for buying (I-shape) and 15% for selling (I’-shape), which would probably char-
acterize it into an attention factor. The absolute favorite seems to be the turn
factor with 47% Buy (I-shape) and 46% (I’-shape). However, turn is measuring
the average trade volume and the relation might indicate that many funds trade
42
stocks which are actively traded by the market. This could indicate herding
behavior. Momentum factors also seem to have significant directionalities, but
only in V and V’ shapes.
Figure 2.21: IV Buy/Sell Fitting Shapes by Factor
Results: Classification of Factors into Attention and Action
After performing the IVNM fitting, I search for Action and Attention patterns
to classify factors for each fund. Rules for classifying a factor as ”Action” for a
given fund are:
• A factor has Buy and Sell directionality curves
• The direction of Buy and Sell curves are opposite to each other (e.g.
{V, V ′}, {I, I ′})
• The combined B & S signals: either don’t have an acceptable directionality
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shape, or the range of the shape is insignificant (less than 20% of the range
of the B and S shapes)
The reason I add the 3rd condition is to account for the small variations of the B
& S curves due to the noise. Out of approximately 5500 funds I consider, 4900 of
them had at least one Action or Attention factor classification (see figure 2.22).
Figure 2.22: Action/Attention Classification Statistics
Analogously, I define rules for classifying a factor as Action for a given fund
• Combined B & S signals have an acceptable directionality shape
• The range of the combined B & S directionality shapes is at least 20% of
the range of the B and S curves
As we can see in the figure 2.23, the most popular Action factor is mom6 and
the next 3 Action factors are mom9, mom3 and mom12. So, around a quarter of
the funds in our database rely on the momentum factor while making trading
decisions. As was expected, turn and size are the most common Attention fac-
tors. Size also is an Action factor for around 12% of the funds in the database,
which is probably because factor size is correlated with the price of the stock
and Buy/Sell decisions should certainly depend on the stock’s price.
Combinations of Action and Attention Factors
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Figure 2.23: Percentage of Action/Attention Classifications for a Factor
Next, I study the popular combinations of Action and Attention factors. The
reason is that in the next sections I will analyze the more complex analogue of
the directionality curves. For that reason, it is important to know for how many
funds a pair of factors can represent Action and/or Attention.
Lastly, I implement the directionality curve analysis for the rest of the 63 factors
from the WRDS suite ( [13]). We can see that none of those 63 factors have out-
standing Action or Attention patterns in comparison to the 16 factors I analyzed
before. Hence, I will continue to use the initial 16 factors for the rest of the work.
Change of the Action/Attention Factor Popularity: In order to understand
how the popularity of factors as Action or Attention have changed through the
last 20 years, I divided it into four 5-year intervals and implemented the Ac-
tion/Attention classification (see 2.28).
We can note that mom6 factor was not very popular in 1995-2000, but within
the next 10 years gained more use as an Action factor, but again started to lose
popularity during the . last 5 years4.
4Note that the directionality curves are dependent on the time interval and it is hard to
compare 5 and 20 year fits. Because of that, the sum of the percentages in the 5 year windows
should not be the same as the percentages in the 20 year window figure.
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Figure 2.24: Attention Factors (1994-2014)
2.3.7 Overlapping Effect and the Directionality Maps
Untangling the Overlapping Signals
As we have previously described, analyzing the relation of only one factor with
the actions of a fund could result in overlapping signals. In such a case we
cannot be sure if the reason of the action was the given factor. Moreover, it is
quite logical to expect that the modern funds use more than 1 factor in making
their trading decisions. So, trading actions based on different factors would
introduce a noise. The theoretical method of resolving the overlap is to consider
the cases when all except one factor values are identical and then analyze the
fund’s trading action in relation to that one factor. In practice, of course, it is
46
Figure 2.25: Action Factors (1994-2014)
very hard to find stocks with all except one value being identical.
To resolve the issue of the overlap, for each factor I compare only the cases
when the other factors are ”close enough” to each other. I do that for each fund
in the following way:
• We save the coordinates (v1, ..., vd) of each stock towards which a given
fund had a Buy/Sell action
• For each factor j ∈ 1, ..., d, we consider the d − 1 dimensional subspace of
the rest of the factors
• We group the Buy/Sell observations into 4-10 clusters
• In each cluster, we analyze the directionality shape of the factor j
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Figure 2.26: Action & Attention Factor Pairs (1994-2014)
As an example, I performed the aforementioned steps for the fund with ID
k = 13 of our database. I took 3 factors: size, bm and pcf for clustering and
analyzed the directionality of the mom factor in each cluster. As we can see in
the figure 2.30, in different clusters the fund has different directionality graphs.
The combined (without clustering) directionality graph of the momentum factor
is given in the figure 2.31.
The phenomenon also holds for other randomly selected funds in our database.
To conclude, we saw that a fund might have different preferences towards the
same factor in different factor regions. Hence, it may not be possible to aggre-
gate the preferences of multiple funds by simply combining their 1-dimensional
absolute directionality graphs.
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Figure 2.27: Results of the IVNM A|A fitting on the remaining 63 factors
(1994-2014)
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Figure 2.28: Changes in the Popularity of Factors within the Funds
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Figure 2.29: Accessor Funds, Inc: Small to Mid Cap Fund; Class A Shares
Figure 2.30: Different Directionality in Different Clusters
Figure 2.31: Momentum: Combined Directionality
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Directionality Maps:
In theory, if we have a very large amount of observations, we could construct
analogues of the directionality curves, but in multiple dimensions. In such a
case, the overlapping effect will be no more relevant. However, considering
too many dimensions is not practical either. The more dimensions we have, the
exponentially less observations we get per a discrete lattice of a fixed length. So,
the number of factors I will typically choose is less than 5. Moreover, with the
1-dimensional analysis we were able to find the absolute directionalities of the
funds towards single factors. For the majority of the funds the directionality is
limited to less than 5 factors.
Next, using an analogous approach as in the one-dimensional case, I construct a
multi-dimensional directionality curve, which I call the preference directional-
ity map. In multiple dimensions, I use the range-search algorithm (see Bentley
(1979) or Robinson (1981)) for the error smoothing. The algorithm works in
O(dnlog(n)) time and runs typically in less than a second (on a desktop PC) if
applied to any single fund in our database. After applying the smoothing, I also
use a triangulation-based linear interpolant to first interpolate and then extrap-
olate the values of the map at different points. The directionality map of the
k=11 entry of our database is presented in the figure 2.32.
We could see that, although the aforementioned fund prefers low bm as its
absolute directionality, as a result of multi-dimensional preference analysis, the
factor mom overlaps the effect of the bm factor. Hence, we conclude once more
that combining mutual funds by their general trading philosophies could intro-
duce a bias because funds trade differently in the different factor regions. To
resolve the issue, I will introduce a theoretical framework which will help us to
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Figure 2.32: Sample Directionality Map - Accessor Funds: Growth Portfo-
lio
understand how to combine the directionality maps of the different funds.
Further, I apply the model to reconstruct the directionality maps of two value
and two growth funds. I chose the funds from BlackRock and Fidelity to rep-
resent popular US equity mutual funds (see figure: 2.33). We can see that the
growth funds (the upper two maps) have completely opposite trading patterns
compared to the value funds (lower two maps). Although the directionality
maps from different funds look quite different, it is also easy to note the visual
similarity within the value funds and the growth fund. The two value funds
tend to buy high bm and low mom stocks, which they sell when the mom in-
creases. The two growth funds, on the other hand side, buy high mom stocks
and sell them when the mom becomes lower. Thus, using the directionality
maps we can clearly see the similarity within the different beliefs on how to
generate profits. Moreover, we note that two different funds under a larger
company could take completely opposite bets in the equity market (counter-
party).
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Figure 2.33: Example: Directionality Maps of Value and Growth Funds
Combining the Directionality Maps:
We have seen that there exists some persistence in the trading patterns of the
mutual funds. Given the stochastic and sometimes discretionary nature of in-
vesting, it is unlikely that one could predict the exact trading decisions of an
actively managed fund. However, a natural extension might be to combine the
directionality maps of multiple funds. By doing so, the stochastic aspects of in-
vesting could ”cancel each other out” and predicting the aggregate fund actions
could become realistic. I devote the next chapter to discussing this topic.
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2.4 The Action|Attention Trader
In this section, I create a framework which will allow us to combine the direc-
tionality maps of multiple funds. I start by discussing the motivation behind
designing a model, which in addition to the concepts of Attention and Action
factors, introduces a new one I call an Interest Group. After, I create a theoreti-
cal framework to model the trading decisions of a given fund. The framework
will help us to understand better the intuition behind the model in the previ-
ous chapter and how exactly we should combine the directionality maps of the
funds. Finally, I will be able to model the collective trading decisions of the US
Mutual funds.
2.4.1 The Investment Process of a Fund
As we have found in the previous section, for many funds we can classify the
set of factors as Attention or Action. But, apart from probabilistic reasons, the
investors might also pay more attention to stocks they hold in their portfolio
in comparison to stocks they never held. I will classify the investor-security
relationship based on whether the investor currently holds the security, held it
at some point in the past or never had the security in her portfolio. I will call the
latter the interest group of an investor in regard to a security. The three groups
of interest are represented in the figure 2.34. Note that by ”holding” I mean that
the investor has a position in the security, which might be either long or short.
The issue with the interest group was not relevant in the previous chapter, be-
cause we were analyzing the past trading actions only. If we saw a Buy ob-
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Figure 2.34: The Interest Group
servation, we already knew that the fund chose to act on the given stock. But,
even for investors with the same trading philosophies, their actions towards a
security might be different depending on their current portfolio holdings. In
our economy traders with the same investment philosophy might still choose
different assets due to their pre-existing portfolios, the subsets of assets under
consideration, or purely by chance. For example, suppose there are two iden-
tical copies of the same investor: Copy 1 and Copy 2 with a long-only strategy
who manage different portfolios. Assume one of them is holding the security
and the other has never held it. Then, if an information event for that security
arrives, the Copy 1 investor might act on it since she was keeping the stock un-
der radar. The Copy 2 investor might not be that interested in the stock which
she never held. Besides, even if she did, Copy 1 can sell the security whereas
Copy 2 cannot.
For the ease of presentation, I denote the interest group of an investor towards
an asset with letters H , EH or NH , where:
• H - investor currently holds the asset
• EH - investor was holding the asset in the past but does not hold it now
• NH - investor never held the asset in the past.
Next, I present a heuristic framework of an investment process (see 2.35) which
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I will assume the funds follow. Here, there are Attention and Action factors for
a given fund. New information on the finite number of factors is arriving to
the investor continuously in time. The fund has some trading philosophy and a
pre-existing portfolio.
Figure 2.35: The Investment Process
Using the Attention factors, from each interest group the fund chooses stocks to
consider. Next, out of the stocks under consideration, using Action factors, the
fund decides which ones to act on and how much to Buy or Sell. Depending on
the interest group, the fund’s sensitivity towards Action factor changes might
be different. Note that simple risk adjustments and re-balancing might be also
considered within this model.
Based on the developed intuition, in the next section I construct a formal theo-
retical framework of an economy which consists of ”Action|Attention” traders.
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2.4.2 Theoretical Framework: Action|Attention Model
The information set is the same as defined in the previous section. That is, there
exists a finite but potentially very large number d of factors f = [f1, ..., fd], de-
scribing each asset and the economy. Time is continuous but the funds holdings
are available at discrete times t = [0, q, 2q, ...]. For each j ∈ [1, ..., d] and a fixed
fund, the factor fj belongs to only one of the 3 factor types: Attention, Action
or Indifference. For a given fund, I assume that the type of the factor j ∈ [1, ..., d]
does not change. However, the same factor j might be in different types for
different funds. To simplify the notation, up until the section where I define the
A|A economy, I choose one of the funds in the market and fix it.
The market has a finite number n of securities. For each security i the vector
Vit := {vi,j(t) ∈ R, j = 1, ..., d} ∈ Rd represents the values of factors f at time t.
Also, if we drop i then Vt would represent the information of some fixed security
at the time t and V would represent the factor values of a fixed security in the
discussions where the time is irrelevant. We denote by Vt the n × d matrix of
vectors Vit for i = 1, ..., n.
The Incomplete Set of Observations:
In our model the fund’s decisions can only be observed discretely but the infor-
mation can arrive and change continuously in time. Because of that, we cannot
be sure exactly at which factor value the trading action was made (see e.g. 2.36).
Later in the section we will have the tools to measure that value more accurately.
Let us fix one stock, then for a time s in the period (t, t+ q), I define
t(s) =
max{Vu : u ∈ (t, s)} −min{Vu : u ∈ (t, s)}
2
, (2.17)
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Figure 2.36: Example: Uncertainty in the Factor Value at the Time of the
Trading Action
where the max/min are taken point-wise. Next, we denote
V t (s) =
max{Vu : u ∈ (t, s)}+ min{Vu : u ∈ (t, s)}
2
(2.18)
and let t := t(t + q), V t := V t (t + q). I also assume that there exists an  < ∞
such that t < . The idea behind such a definition, is that the trading decisions
are likely to be caused by extremes in the information values in the interval.
However, at this point we cannot know by which of the extremes it was caused
by and thus we have to record the range of the extremes t and the average of
the extremes V t . We have defined V t (s) and t(s) so that in the next sections we
have the framework to predict the trading actions in the period (t, t + q] based
on the information at time s ∈ (t, t + q]. The closer we choose s to t + q, the
better V t (s) and t(s) would approximate V t and t. However, if we choose s to
be very close to t + q, the length of the prediction (s, t + q] would decrease and
the prediction would become less meaningful.
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To simplify the presentation of the material, I assume that t is a constant and is
equal to . On practice, the values of t are easy to compute and only complicate
the notation. So, for now I assume that for each quarter the information about
the securities in the market is perceived by the ”average” factor values in the
region (t, t+ q) denoted by V t which has a range V t ± .
The assumptions on fund’s trading which I impose are very weak and the
only assumption is that funds do not explicitly copy each others’ trading de-
cisions. I will give a formal definition to such type of trading and call it the
Action|Attention (A|A) Trading Process.
Description of The Trading Process:
The fund’s next trading decision in regards to a security only depends on:
1. security’s current and historical factor values
2. factor values of the other securities in the market
3. fund’s current and previous holdings history
4. fund’s investment philosophy (to be defined in the next section)
The Extended A|A Trader:
First, I introduce a one-period extended A|A model. Suppose we are at a time T ,
which is a multiple of q. The discrete set of information produced by the securi-
ties during the ”learning period” [0, 1, ..., T ] is saved in the T×n×d dimensional
array V := [V0, ..., VT ]. At the time T , each fund has an initial portfolio PT ∈ Rn
and an interest group (history) vector IT ∈ {H,EH,NH}n. The interest group
vector is formed by recording which stocks the fund has held by the time T .
Definition 2.4.1 (The Extended A|A Process). We call {D∗B, D∗S} an extended
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Action|Attention process, if D∗B, D∗S are [0,∞)n valued random fields on the space
R(T+1)×n×d × {H,EH,NH}n.
D∗B and D
∗
S represent the (time T ) dollar amounts that will be in-
vested/liquidated (if any) in each of the n assets within (T, T + q]. We can as-
sume that the random fields are isotropic for simplicity. That is, the correlation
between the random variables is only dependent on their spatial distance from
each other. I would refer to D∗B and D
∗
S as the extended Buy and Sell decision
processes.
We call a fund to be Extended A|A Trader, if it has an Extended A|A trading
process {D∗B, D∗S} and the dollar amount which the fund invests/liquidates in
the securities 1, ..., n between (T, T + q] is:
D∗B(VT ,V , IT ) and D∗S(VT ,V , IT ). (2.19)
Next, I discuss how to reduce the aforementioned model to make it tractable.
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2.4.3 The Reduced Model: Input and Output Transformations
Making investment decisions might depend not just on the information about
one given stock, but also on its comparison to the other stocks in the market
or the stock’s past. In other words, investing decisions are usually based on
the information about more than one security. Because of that, in the extended
definition of the A |A model, the decision function was dependent on all the rel-
evant factor values in the market up to time T : V ∈ RT×n×d. However, modeling
the fund trading in such a manner requires a very large number of observations
and is not practical. To resolve the issue, I will define measures which will re-
duce the problem but keep the relational nature of the trading in our model.
I introduce an Input Transformation to pre-process all the necessary compar-
isons and rankings, so that we are able to simplify the decision function. The
aim is to make the decision function not be explicitly dependent on the whole
market information from RT×n×d.
Input Transformation:
We call the collection of functions µinp = {µ1inp, ..., µninp} an Input Transformation,
if for each security i = 1, ..., n:
µiinp : R(T+1)×n×d × {H,EH,NH}n → [1, 10]× {H,EH,NH}. (2.20)
If we apply the µinp on {VT ,V , IT}, the resulting would be a ”ranking” for
each of the securities, coupled with information of (only) that security’s interest
group. There are no restrictions on the ”rankings” process and it could be e.g.
within the fund’s portfolio, within the stock exchange or the industry. Thus, the
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transformation does all the necessary comparisons and helps us to separate the
problem so that we can consider each stock ”independently”.
As we have previously discussed, the trading action observations might be
noisy and do not account for inflows/outflows or risk adjustment of the fund.
So, the actual trading patterns of the fund might be not in the raw dollar
amounts of the trades. Thus, to further simplify the decision function, I no more
assume that its output is the dollar amount of the trade. Instead, I will apply
an output transformation to the trading observations to reconstruct the appro-
priate decision function. Later, I will apply an inverse output transformation to
the decision function to track the evolution of the fund’s portfolio.
Output Transformation (Applied to Observations):
µo : Rn × RT×n → Rn. (2.21)
Inverse Output Transformation (Applied to The Decision Functions):
µ′o : Rn → Rn. (2.22)
An example of an output transformation is dividing the time T + q holding
changes of a fund in a given stock by its time T holdings. An inverse output
transformation in that case would be to multiply the time T + q output of a
decision function by the time T holdings. I assume that the V ∈ RT×n (history)
is implicitly incorporated in the inverse output transformation.
Information in the Reduced Framework:
Next, I assume that an appropriate Input Transformation has been already ap-
plied to the information set. So, in the reduced framework, for each security the
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input information has a form [1, 10]d×{H,EH,NH}. As a result: Vt ∈ [1, 10]n×d,
Vt ∈ [1, 10]n×d and Vit ∈ [1, 10]d.
I proceed by introducing the concept of an Investment Philosophy Type, which
will help us to reduce the dimension of the problem even more.
Definition 2.4.2 (The Investment Philosophy Type). We call Πpi1,...,pid with pii ∈
{−1, 0, 1}i=1,..,d an investment philosophy type if Πpi1,...,pid is a projection from [1, 10]d,
taking the dimensions i ∈ [1, ..., d] for which pii 6= 0 to [1, 10].
The values of pii : {−1, 0, 1} represent whether the factor i is Attention, Indif-
ference or Action, in that order. In some sense, it is used to reduce the di-
mension of the input information to remove the indifference factors. Denote
d+ :=
∑d
i=1 1pii>0 (action dimension), d− :=
∑d
i=1 1pii<0 (attention dimension)
and dΠ := d+ + d−. The latter would represent the dimensionality of the in-
formation set for an investor with philosophy type Πpi1,...,pid (Π for short). So,
Π is a projection from [1, 10]d onto [1, 10]d− × [1, 10]d+ . As a result, I am able to
define a more tractable version of the A|A process. Next, assume the notation
?<0 =

= | ? |, if ? < 0
= 0, if ? ≥ 0
and an analogous one for ?>0, where all the operations are done element-wise.
Definition 2.4.3 (The A|A Process). We call {D,Π} an Action|Attention process,
if Π is a philosophy type and for I ∈ {H,EH,NH}, DB(·, I) := D(·, I)>0 and
DS(·, I) := D(·, I)<0 are [0,∞) valued random fields on the space [1, 10]dΠ .
I call DB(·, I) and DS(·, I) the Buy and Sell decision functions. However, the
64
decision function has a different meaning in the reduced framework. The reason
is that to have a tractable decision function, we need to make it dependent
only on the ”persistent patterns” of the fund trading. For example, the amount
of Buy might be dependent on the total size of the fund. The latter changes
depending on inflows and many other external factors. The amount of sell,
on the other hand, is dependent on the amount of holdings of a given security
in the previous quarter. So, we need an interpretation of the decision function
which is independent from the aforementioned external factors. I introduce two
interpretations of the decision function. I describe the first interpretation below
for the Sell decision function DS(·, I) and the one for DB(·, I) is analogous.
Interpretation of the Decision Function:
DS(V

it, I) is the fraction of the fund’s time t total holdings which the fund will
liquidate (short) in the stock i within (t, t+ q], where:
• i is in the interest group I ∈ {H,EH,NH} at time t
• i has a factor decomposition V i which was estimated in (t, t + q] with un-
certainty ±.
While computing the aforementioned fraction, I divide the time t price of the
holdings changes within (t, t + q] by the time t total holdings price of the fund.
I do so to make the decision function independent from the realized price
changes. Note that in this case the smaller positions of the fund would receive
a much smaller weight. To mitigate that issue, for the case when I = H , I will
define an alternative Decision Function.
Interpretation of the Alternative Decision Function:
We denote by DHS (V

it) the fraction of the fund’s time t holdings of the stock i
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which the fund will liquidate within (t, t+ q], where:
• i is in the interest group I = H at time t
• i has a factor decomposition V it which was estimated in (t, t + q] with un-
certainty ±.
I assume that DHS and D
H
B are also [0,∞) valued random fields on [1, 10]dΠ . I
denoteDHS (V

it) := DS(V

it), so if the decision function has one entry it is assumed
to be the alternative decision function. Note that the decision function defined
in this way is only meaningful for the cases when the time t holdings of the fund
in the stock i are non-zero. Otherwise, the value would be infinity. However,
in a framework with no shorting a Sell requires I = H , so the aforementioned
definition might be used.
For the ease of notation, I accumulate the decision functions DS(V it, Iit) for i =
1, ..., n into a vector of the decision functions:
DS(Vt , It) := [DS(V 1t, I1t), ..., DS(V nt, Int)]. (2.23)
Independent from the interpretation of the decision function, I assume that µ′o,
the inverse output measure, transforms the output of the decision function to
represent the time t dollar amount of the trading action. In some case µ′o might
change depending on t or other variables and we think of it as a rule that would
ease the notation, rather than a well-defined static function. Similarly, for DB
and DS the rule µ′o might act differently. Following our notation, the time t
dollar amount of Buy/Sell/combined of the fund within (t, t+ q] is equal to:
µ′o(DB(Vt , It)), µ′o(DS(Vt , It)) and (2.24)
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µ′o(D(Vt , It)) = µ′o(DB(Vt , It))− µ′o(DS(Vt , It)) (2.25)
The A|A Trader:
Now we are ready to introduce the A|A trader into our model. Assume that
at the time 0, our fund has an initial portfolio P0 ∈ Rn and an interest group
(history) vector I0 ∈ {H,EH,NH}n. I denote the portfolio holdings (in number
of shares) of the fund at time t = [0, q, 2q, ...] by Pt ∈ Rn and I assume that all
the necessary share adjustment have been performed.
Definition 2.4.4 (The A|A Trader). We call a fund to be an A|A Trader, if it follows
an A|A trading process {D,Π} coupled with an inverse output transformation µ′o, such
that the time t dollar amount which the fund invests/liquidates in the stocks i = 1, ..., n
with an interest set It between (t, t+ q] is equal to:
µ′o(D(Π(Vt ), It)). (2.26)
Denote the per-share price of the stock i at time t by the vector Mt =
[mt1, ...,mtn]. Also, I denote by Rt1,t2 = {r1(t1, t2), ..., rn(t1, t2)} the return of the
securities in the time intervals (t1, t2] (including all the necessary adjustments).
In particular, Rt := Rt−1,t and Rtq := Rt,t+q.
One can note that using symbolsH,EH,NH , we can represent the interest level
of the fund It ∈ {H,EH,NH}n for t > 0 with Pt:
Iit = [H I{P it 6=0} + EH I{P it=0, P is 6=0:s<t} + NH I{P is 6=0:s≤t}] i=1,...,n. (2.27)
The Evolution of the A|A’s Portfolio:
Next, it is easy to see that in our framework for the fund holdings at time t =
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[q, 2q, ...] the following equation holds:
Mt ◦ (Pt+q − Pt) = µ′0(D(Π(Vt ), It)), (2.28)
where ◦ is the element-wise product of vectors (Hadamard product). So, if we
assume that the division is element-wise for vectors/matrices, then the fund’s
portfolio evolves according to the equation:
Pt+q = Pt +
µ′0(D(Π(Vt ), It))
Mt
. (2.29)
Conversely, I can represent the values of the Buy/Sell decision functions using
the changes in portfolio holdings as follows:
DB(Vt , It) = µo(Mt ◦ (Pt+q − Pt))>0, (2.30)
DS(Vt , It) = µo(Mt ◦ (Pt+q − Pt))<0, (2.31)
Hence, in case of the first and the alternative interpretations of the decision func-
tion, we accordingly have:
µ′o(D(Π(Vt ), It) = (D(Π(Vt ), It) ◦Mt)1Pt (2.32)
µ′o(D(Π(Vt ))) = D(Π(Vt )) ◦Mt ◦ Pt, (2.33)
where 1 is the vector of n ones.
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An Ad-Hoc Method of Approximating the Future Information: For one fixed
stock, note that V t represents the changes in the information within (t, t+q] and
is not known before the time t + q. However, if we choose s ∈ (t, t + q], then by
increasing  to some ′, we can make sure that [V ′t (s) − ′, V ′t (s) + ′] (element-
wise) includes the sets [V t − , V t + ]. Studying each source of information in
more details, we could potentially assume a stochastic evolution function on
V t (s) and further approximate V t by V 
′
t (s). However, for simplicity, I discuss
the case when s is sufficiently close to t+ q so that I will assume V t (s) ≈ V t .
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The A|A Economy
Next, I construct an economy of a finite number of A|A Traders. I start by de-
scribing the assumptions in the A|A economy. I assume that the market consists
of k investors who follow an A|A process {Dj,Πj}with an initial states (P j0 , Ij0).
I also assume that the decision functions DjB and D
j
S are independent.
The framework is the same as defined earlier. So, the information changes are
exogenous and saved in the matrix Vt ∈ Rd×n for the time t. The cumulative
shares which the funds hold in a given stock is represented by the vector P ∗t =
[P ∗1 , ..., P
∗
n ]. Hence, the cumulative fund holdings evolve according to
P ∗t+q = P
∗
t +
∑k
j=1 µ
′
0(Dj(Πj(V t ), It)
Mt
(2.34)
In particular, we can rewrite it as:
µo(P
∗
i(t+q)) = µo(P
∗
it) +
∑k
j=1 D
j(Πj(V it), It)
Mt
, (2.35)
which we could further expand to:
µo(P
∗
i(t+q)) = µo(P
∗
it) +
∑k
j=1D
j
B(Π
j(V it), It)
Mt
−
∑k
j=1D
j
S(Π
j(V it), It)
Mt
(2.36)
Note that Dj are independent, which means that the trading decisions are made
independently. The funds could still herd when the stock enters an ”opinion-
ated region” where funds have strong opinions to buy/sell it. So, in this model
the different investment philosophies might have common factors. However,
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each investment philosophy has a unique set of beliefs about what kind of factor
decomposition of a security has higher chances to generate profits. So, investors
of different philosophies might find different decompositions more appealing.
Next, if we assume the alternative interpretation of the preference function, the
cumulative demand of the market towards the asset i is equal to:
P ∗i(t+q) − P ∗it =
∑k
j=1D
j(Πj(V it), It)P
j
it
Mt
. (2.37)
I assume that the demand from the institutional investors is satisfied by the re-
maining market participants and the process is exogenous. I will use the afore-
mentioned framework for predicting the cumulative fund actions. But before
doing so, I also introduce the preference function and discuss how to compute
its expectation.
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2.4.4 The Preference Function
In this section, I formally introduce the Preference Function. It was informally
used before, to construct the directionality graphs and maps. Let V  ∈ [1, 10]dΠ
be an  region around the factor quantity V . I will define a function which
describes the fund’s preferences towards the factor regions rather than towards
specific stocks.
Definition 2.4.5 (The Preference Function). For a philosophy type Π, we call the
function P a preference function, if PB := P>0 and PS := P<0 are R≥0 valued random
fields on the space [1, 10]dΠ .
Analogous to the case with the decision functions, I assume that there exists
an inverse output transformation µ′o such that µ′o(P(V it)) represents the time t
dollar price of the cumulative share changes of the fund in the factor region V it.
I will give two interpretations to the preference functions, which I will apply
in different scenarios. Suppose that a given fund liquidated a fraction of its
position in the stock i during (t, t + q]. Next, assume that the stock’s average of
the extremes V it is in the  region of a factor quantity V . Then, I call the stock
i to be liquidated in the region V . Next, I introduce the interpretations of the
function PS (the ones for PB are defined in an analogous way).
Interpretation of the Preference Function:
PS(V t ) is the fraction of the fund’s sell within the region V t over the fund’s total
holdings at the time t.
Alternative Interpretation of the Preference Function:
PS(V t ) is the fraction of the fund’s sell within the region V t compared to the
fund’s total sell during (t, t+ q].
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Note that for this case, the output transformation is the µ2O defined in the previ-
ous section. In both of the cases, I take the time t prices of the securities.
The function P represents the Buy/Sell trading based on a factor region rather
a specific stock. Both theoretically and in practice, it gives the idea on the pref-
erences of the fund towards a factor region. In practice PS(V t ) might be easier
to fit to the data, since it is the fraction of the sell within the sell signals i.e. it is
a sell ”given sell”.
Next, I introduce some notations.
• St − set of all the sell actions in (t, t+ q]
• St(V t ) − the subset of St where the average of the sell actions are within
the  region of the factor V ∈ [1, 10]dΠ
• Stj(V t ) − the amount of jth sell action in St(V t ).
Expectation of the Preference Function:
So, per the alternative interpretation, PS(V t ) is the fraction of the total dollar
amount (per all stocks) liquidated in the given factor region V t . Hence, we can
write the expected amount of Sell in a factor region as
E(PS(V t )) = ES(all stocks ∈ V t ) = ES(all stocks ∈ V t |stock was sold). (2.38)
which we can approximate by
E(P(V t )) ≈
#St(V t )∑
j=1
µo(Stj(V t )) (2.39)
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Note that the equation above has the same form as the error-smoothing pro-
cedure of the previous section. So, we can see that (for the output measure
µ2O), the directionality graphs and maps represented the expected fraction of the
Buy/Sell action in a given factor region.
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2.4.5 Expectation of the Decision Function
In this section, I discuss how to interpret and reconstruct the expectations of the
decision functions from a discrete set of observations.
Definition 2.4.6 (Expectation of the Decision Function). We denote by mB (mS)
the expectations of the decision function DB (DS).
Note that mB and mS are deterministic functions defined on [1, 10]dΠ . First, for
the ease of presentation, I assume that Π has been applied to the input data V
and I suppress writing V as an argument. In particular, I assume that dΠ = d for
this section.
Interpretation of the Expectations:
By the definition, µ′o(DS(V t , I)) is the dollar amount of a liquidation per 1 given
stock within the interest group I , if the stock was in the region V t during (t, t+
q]. Thus, its mean is the expected amount of Sell per 1 stock with parameters
{V t , I}. We can informally represent the aforementioned expectation as:
ES(1 stock ∈ V t ) = ES(1 stock ∈ V t |stock was sold)P (stock was sold). (2.40)
It is easy to see that the expectation depends on the probability that the fund will
liquidate a given stock. That probability varies significantly in between the in-
terest groups H , EH and NH . Moreover, for an environment with no shorting,
that probability is obviously 0 for the Sell action inEH andNH . Because of that,
I will discuss and fit the decision functions in the different interest groups, sep-
arately. After introducing some definitions, I will first consider the case when
the interest group is H.
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Generating the Trading Observations:
We generate trading observations from the evolution of the portfolio holding
process and introduce new definitions. To keep the notation simple, I assume
that all the stock shares are adjusted for share distributions. The process of
adjusting for share distributions on practice is discussed in the previous chapter.
Let us denote the changes of the holdings of a fund from t to t + q by Ct :=
Pt+q − Pt. As a result, indexes i ∈ [1, ..., n] such that Cit > 0 would indicate a
Buy action, Cit < 0 would indicate a Sell action and cases when Cit = 0 would
indicate a Hold decision (no change) for the stock i in the fund’s portfolio.
Next, I introduce some definitions for Buy (B), Sell (S) and Hold (H) actions
within the interest groups I={H, EH, NH}. For simplicity, I will write them
only for S and the definitions for B and H are analogous.
• Nt − the set of stocks held by the fund at time t.
• Nt(V t ) − the subset of stocks in Nt which are in the region V t at the time
t+ q.
• SIt − set of all the sell actions in (t, t + q] within the interest group I ∈
{H,EH,NH}
• SIt (V t ) − the subset of SIt , such that the average of the factor quantifica-
tions of the stock is within the  region of the factor V ∈ [1, 10]dΠ
• SItj(V t ) − the amount of jth sell action in SIt (V t ).
Estimating the Expectations of the Decision Function
The Interest Group H:
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We don’t have access to the shorting data in our databases. As a result, the sell
decisions can act only within the interest group H. For the case when the interest
group I is H, I omit writing the superscript, e.g. SHt = St.
Next, note that we can re-write the equation 2.40 as:
E(DS(V

t , I)) = E(DS(V

t , I)|V t ∈ SIt (V t ))P (V t ∈ SIt (V t )), (2.41)
which for the interest group I=H we can further simplify to
E(DS(V

t )) = E(DS(V

t )|V t ∈ St(V t ))P (V t ∈ St(V t )). (2.42)
Thus, for a fixed time t we can estimate the mean function at sample points V it
where i = 1, 2, ...,#St by:
m̂S[V

it] ≈
∑#St(V it)
j=1 µo(Stj(V it))
#St(V )
#St(V

it)
#Nt(V it)
(2.43)
Which we can re-write as:
m̂S[V

it] ≈
∑#St(V it)
j=1 µo(Stj(V it))
#Nt(V it)
(2.44)
To give a better understanding of the process, see the figure 2.37, below.
We can see that the expected amount of sell per 1 stock in a factor region is in
fact equal to the total sell in the region, divided by the combined number of
B/S/H observations.
Combining the Observations from Multiple Quarters
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Figure 2.37: Hypothetical Example - Trading Actions in a Factor Region
Our aim is to reconstruct the functions mS and mB. It might be unrealistic to
assume that a given analytic function represents those expected values. So, I
will reconstruct the expectations of the decision functions numerically. To do
so, I will compute the values of mS and mB on a finite grid and then extrapolate
at select points of interest, as needed. Note that if the number of the dimen-
sions dΠ is large, and if the length of the smoothing region is #epsilon, then
the space of the observations would be divided into roughly (9/)dΠ number of
parts. As a result, if we assume that the observations are uniformly distributed
in dΠ, then we can expect to have # of obsevations
(9/)dΠ
points in each  region. Thus, the
more dimensions we have, the exponentially less observation we will get for
an  region. So, having too many dimensions in dΠ would result in few to no
observations in each region and will make the fitted expectations volatile. To
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resolve the aforementioned issue, on practice we would keep the number of the
dimensions in each of the trading philosophy type small (1-3 factors).
But, even for 2 factors and an  = 0.9, the average number of points for each
-region is # of obsevations
100
. The average number of trading observations per quar-
ter per fund typically varies between 90 and 120. So, if the trading observations
were distributed uniformly, for an  = 0.9 region we would have around 1 ob-
servation. Fortunately, the distribution of the observations is not uniform and
on practice the aforementioned example would produce around 10 − 30 obser-
vation per non-empty  region. However, 10− 30 observation per region might
still not be enough to find a reliable estimate of an expectation.
To resolve the issue, I combine observations from T quarters at once. Taking T
to be too large might result in neglecting the changes of a fund’s trading style.
I assume that it takes more than 5 years for a fund to completely change it’s
investment philosophy. We take T to be a multiple of q, typically T ∈ [1∗4q, 5∗4q]
and T will represent the length of the moving window for estimating the first
moment of the decision functions.
Next, I join observations from T quarters: qs, ..., qe and approximate the m̂S at
the observation points based on the formula, below:
m̂S(V

it) ≈
∑#S∗T (V it)
j=1 µo(S
∗
jt(V

it))
#N∗T (V

it)
, (2.45)
where N∗T = ∪t∈[qs,qe]Nt and S∗T = ∪t∈[qs,qe]St. I will assume the aforementioned
approximation for all except the case when dΠ = 1. The intuition behind such
an approximation comes from the interpretation of the expected value we are
trying to approximate. Since the desired expectation is the expected amount of
79
sell per 1 stock in a factor region, we can combine multiple quarters, because
it will mean combining all observations B/S/H at the same time. Hence, the
probability of a sell per given stock and the average amount of sell per given
stock should not change considerably. To graphically explain the intuition, I
present a hypothetical example in the figure 2.38, below. The presented scenario
is the case when the trading actions of the fund during two consecutive factors
were similar (I combined the 2.37 with its slightly shifted version).
Figure 2.38: Hypothetical Example - Combining Trading Actions from
Two Quarters
An alternative way to compute the m̂S is to estimate the m̂S for multiple quarters
and then average the estimate. The approximation in that case would be:
m̂S(V

it) ≈
1
T
∑
t∈[qs,qe]
∑#St(V it)
j=1 µo(Stj(V

it))
#Nt(V it)
(2.46)
However, the alternative approximation is susceptible to the issue of the rare
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observations (described earlier)for dΠ ≥ 2. Because of that I will assume the
alternative approximation only for the case dΠ = 1.
The formulas and approximation methods for Buy|Hold (B|H) are analogous to
the S case.
Constructing a Gridded Interpolant
Next, I compute the approximation of m̂S and m̂B on the vertices of a finite
grid on [1, 10]dΠ with the grid-length g . I denote the vertices of the grid by V kt
for k = 1, ..., (1 + 9/g)dΠ . Note that independent of how small we choose the
grid-length, the number of observations in a region is still dependent on the
size of . Next, I plug in the value V kt in the equation 2.45 to approximate the
expectations from the trading observations on the grid (I require 20 observations
for each factor region, otherwise I do not save its value).
An important step in computing efficiently the expectations of the decision
function is to find the values #Nt(V ) and determine the set St(V ). To do so,
for each trading observation and/or a grid-vertex we would need to find all
other trading observations within its  neighborhood. I use the range-search
algorithm (see Bentley (1979), Robinson (1981)) to efficiently compute the afore-
mentioned values.
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The Interest Groups EH and NH:
I begin by describing the motivation behind using a different approach of re-
trieving trading signals within the interest groups EH and NH. For a given fund,
the interest group H is typically small (tens to hundreds of stocks). Besides, a
fund tends to be more active within the interest group H and in a given quarter
we typically see trading actions towards at least 10% of H. For the cases when
the set EH is small (less than 10 times H), I use the same methodology as was
described for the interest group H.
However, usually the number of the stocks in the interest groups EH and NH
is considerably larger than in the interest group H (see the section 2.4.5). So, a
B or S action is expected towards a very small percentage of the {EH,NH} se-
curities. As a result, it might be impossible to accurately pinpoint which stocks
would be bought or sold, particularly within the set NH. Alternatively, note that
the value P (stock was sold) can be very close to 0 for all of the stocks. The latter
will results in volatile predictions if I use the methodology of the interest group
H (see equation 2.40).
The interest group {EH,NH} has all the stocks which are not currently in the
fund’s portfolio. In the majority of the funds with more than 5 years of holdings
history, that set covers the factor values pretty much uniformly, as shown below
in the figure 2.39.
Fortunately, the estimation of the preference function was independent from
the choice of the interest groups. Using the first interpretation of the prefer-
ence function, I estimate the expected fraction of B/S (in comparison to fund’s
previous quarter holdings) in a given factor region. Next, I consider only ”opin-
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Figure 2.39: Hypothetical Representation of the EH and NH Interest
Groups
ionated” regions, that is the ones where the value of the expectation of the ac-
tions is comparatively large (more than 10% of the trading actions fall within
the region).
I further describe the approach on a hypothetical example in the figure 2.40,
below. Suppose that based on the 3 years of observations, we found a factor
region from where the fund tends to Buy a large portion of its stocks (left side of
the figure). I assume that the fund is ”opinionated” towards that factor region
and based on its investment philosophy and/or experience expects stocks from
that region to outperform. Next, at a time period (T, T + q] I observe the stocks
which enter that factor region (right side of the figure). We can see that there are
stocks from EH as well as NH in it. Note that, using the preference function, we
have that the expected fraction of Buy in the given factor region is: E(PB(V t )),
which I estimated independently from the choice of the interest groups. Thus,
if the number of the stocks which are in the factor region during the (T, T + q]
is small (less than 20 stocks), then assuming each of the stocks is chosen with
the same probability, I compute the expected Buy fraction of a fund towards a
stock in the EH/NH region.
Note that opposite to the case of the interest group H, larger dimension of the
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Figure 2.40: Hypothetical Example - Retrieving Signals from an ”Opinion-
ated” Factor Region
input information dΠ might help to decrease the number of the stocks in a factor
region. Thus, we would have a larger chance of pinpointing a stock which a
fund is likely to buy from the region EH/NH (”bless of dimensionality”). I
combine those signals to predict the cumulative fund holding changes. The
details of the implementation are described in the next section.
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Additional Notes on Constructing the Sets H/EH/NH
This sub-section provides some additional details on the implementation of the
H/EH/NH sets for the Action |Attention model. It can be skipped by readers
not interested in the specifics of the implementation.
Action Indicators (Buy/Sell/Hold): For each pair of {fund: k, security: j} we
need to find whether the action of the fund towards the security was Buy/Buy
More, Sell/ Sell All or Hold. Finding this might be tricky since the variable
SHARES might change its value only because of the share distributions. How-
ever, I have already accounted for all such cases.
We are defining the following variables:
• iB - indicator that the action of the fund towards the asset was Buy
• iS - indicator that the action of the fund towards the asset was Sell
• iH - indicator that the action of the fund towards the asset was Hold (non-
zero weight)
Attention Indicators (H/EH/NH): For each pair {fund: k, security: j}, we need
to track the attention of the fund towards the stock. For that reason, I create the
following 3 indicators.
• Hk,j(t) - indicates whether at time t− 1 the fund k was holding the stock j
• EHk,j(t) - indicates whether at times 1, ..., t − 2 but not at time t − 1 the
fund k was holding the stock j
• NHk,j(t) - indicates whether at times 1, ..., t − 1 fund k did not hold the
stock j
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The amount of non-zero inputs in those three sets across all times, funds and
stocks are as follows: H ≈ 25 million, EH ≈ 120 million and NH ≈ 13 billion.
The reason that NH is so large might be that some small stocks are held only
by a few funds and for the rest of the funds, for all the quarters their value will
be NH . To resolve the issue with disproportionate NH set I will restrict the
calculation of NH within an investment philosophy.
Next, I modify the indicators to adjust for the cases when the fund no more
exists. If that happens, then there is no need to continue holding it in the EH
attention group. I do that by excluding funds which did not report at least once
in the next 3 quarters. In that case there are around 90 million valid entries in
EH and with a similar procedure ≈ 5 billion valid entries in NH .
Action|Attention Events: So, in our model there are 7 variations of the ac-
tion/attention events. Those are represented in the chart below.
Figure 2.41: The Types of the Action|Attention Events
For ease of implementation, I will record those into variables B|H, B|EH, B|NH,
S|H, S|EH, S|NH, H|H as a structure and each of them would have information
on three variables: index, amount (of trade) and count (of number of shares
traded).
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2.5 Predicting the Aggregate Fund Actions
As we have previously noted, we do not have access to the fund shorting data.
So, I further fit the implementation of the A|A model to a framework with no
shorting. In such a setting, the trading decisions of a fund in the period (t, t+ q]
are to Sell from H and to Buy from H/EH/NH, as described in the Figure 2.42,
below.
Figure 2.42: Trading Actions in (t, t+ q]
I divide the process of predicting the fund actions into three steps: estimation,
prediction and testing. To incorporate the possible changes in the fund’s trad-
ing philosophy, I fit the values of their decision functions by a moving window
of a fixed length T = 3 ∗ 4 quarters (3 years). I define qe = qs + T and will test
the model at the time Q := qe + q. The exact steps of the estimation process are
described below.
Step 1: Reconstructing the Investment Philosophy Type Πj for each Fund
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• Using the observation of the fund trades in [qs, qe], for each fund fit an
IVNM curve and save the adjusted R2 values
• Based on the IVNM analysis in [qs, qe], classify the 16 factors into Action
and/or Attention types (if possible)
• For each fund, choose 1 Action and 1 Attention factor by choosing the ones
with the largest adjusted R2 values
• If there are no Action factors, then choose the 2 Attention factors with the
largest adjusted R2 values
• If less than 2 Attention factors are available for the fund, merge the trading
observations of the fund to the category ”other”
• Perform the aforementioned analysis for the merged fund category
”other”. If there are still less than 2 Attention factors for the category, no
further predictions will be made for the category
The best Action and Attention factor indexes are saved in Πj for each fund j. So,
using in the first step I constructed the investment philosophy types for each
of the qualified 5 funds. In the next step, I approximate the expectations of the
decision functions.
Step 2: Approximating mB and mS for the Interest Group H
• Construct a grid on [1, 10]2 with a grid-length g = 0.05
• For each grid point, approximate the values mjB(?) and m
j
S(?) for the in-
terest set H using the equation 2.45
5The funds for whom the 1-dimensional analysis produced at least 1 Action & 1 Attention or
2 Attention factors
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• Observe the values of V ′t for the interval [qe, Q − 1). Save it as V t but
choose  = 2′ 6
Thus, at the time Q − 1, using the information on P jqe , the expected amount of
Sell and (Buy|H) during [qe, Q) is:
µo(m̂S(P
j
qe)) and µo(m̂B(P
j
qe)) (2.47)
Step 3: Combining with the Signals in EH and NH
• Approximate E(Pj(?)) on each point of the previously constructed grid
and take  = 0.9
• For the cases when in an -region the fraction of the total Buy is at least 10%
(”opinionated” region), for each EH/NH stock, I increase the prediction
of Buy by the fraction of E(Pj(?)) over the total number of stocks in the
region (i.e. the expected amount of Buy per stock) 7
• Denote the resulting prediction by m̂B(P
j
iqe
, {EH,NH})
Since we are computing the expectations of the decision function, predicting
an instance of a buy or a sell of one stock by one fund is quite unlikely. How-
ever, combining funds and/or combining stocks (with the help of the law of
large numbers) might have a predictive power. Potentially, the model can make
predictions in the following 3 cases:
6I save the average factor values of the two months as V , but to incorporate a larger range
of variability I multiply the ′ by two.
7Note that if the Buy observations were spread uniformly across [1, 10]2, then for each -
region would contain approximately 1% of all Buy observations
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Figure 2.43: The Implementation Workflow
• 1 fund − prediction of cumulative B/S/H
• 1 stock − prediction of cumulative B/S from a subset of funds
• subset of stocks − prediction of cumulative B/S from a subset of funds.
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However, I will only assess the predictive power of our model in the case of
the cumulative fund Sell actions towards each stock. The implementation of the
model is performed in Matlab and the general workflow of the implementation
is presented in the figure 2.43.
Predicting the Next Quarter Cumulative Fund Trades for a Stock:
For a given stock i, if we denote pji := P
j
iqe
, then using the Step 2, the estimated
cumulative fund Sell equal to:
prediS(Q) =
k∑
j=1
µo(m̂S(p
j
i )). (2.48)
Similarly, combining the Steps 2 and 3, the estimated cumulative Buy is equal
to:
prediB(Q) =
k∑
j=1
(µo(m̂B(p
j
i )) + m̂B(p
j
i , {EH,NH})). (2.49)
Discussing the Accuracy of Predictions:
Next, I briefly present and discuss the accuracy of the predictions of the model
in case of Sell actions. I compute the realized cumulative fund sell during (qe, Q]
and for the stock i denote it by realiS(Q). Motivated by the findings of Sias
(2004), that institutional demand for a stock is positively correlated in adjacent
quarters, I also compute the previous quarter institutional sell of a stock and de-
note it by previS(Q). Besides, I record the mean of the expanding window of the
realized cumulative fund sell in the variable meaniS(Q). Because the amount of
the institutional holdings and sell from one stock to another might change sig-
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nificantly, I further analyze the fraction of the prediction over the actual value,
as described below:
fprediS(Q) =
prediS(Q)
realiS(Q)
, fpreviS(Q) =
previS(Q)
real3iS(Q)
, fmeaniS(Q) =
meaniS(Q)
realiS(Q)
(2.50)
Also, I limit the analysis to the stocks which have at least 100 funds holding
them at the time of prediction. I further winsorize the prediction prediS(Q) by
10 ∗ meaniS(Q), in order to control for the outlier predictions. I run simula-
tions for Q = 2003(q1),...,2014(q2) and compute the values fpred (A|A model),
where possible. Within the subset of stocks, for which there was a prediction of
the A|A model , I also compute the fprev (previous quarter’s cumulative insti-
tutional sell) and fmean (mean). The results are presented in the figure. 2.44.
We can see that the numbers of predictions within a range of accuracy has a sea-
sonal character. The underlying reason is that some of the funds in our database
report semi-annually. We can see that in almost all of the cases the predictions
of the A|A model are approximately 2-3 times better than the ones produced by
the other two predictions.
For a randomly selected quarter, I also plot the histogram of the prediction ratio
(see figure 2.45). It is easy to note that the A|A model tends to slightly over-
estimate the predictions, whereas, the previous quarter sell (in the given case)
under-estimates the cumulative fund Sell. The possible reason is that the A|A is
more likely to make a prediction towards a stock which moves to an ”opinion-
ated” region and I only record the stocks for which A|A did make a prediction.
On the other hand, the previous quarter’s institutional sale does not contain
such information and hence its prediction would be the same as when the stock
92
Figure 2.44: Prediction Results for Q = 2003 (q1),...,2014 (q2)
was out of the ”opinionated” region, which explains the lower than actual cu-
mulative trade.
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Figure 2.45: Histogram of the Prediction Accuracy for Q = 2013 (q4)
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CHAPTER 3
GENERAL CONSTRAINT REDUCTION FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction
Some studies have been conducted to empirically measure the illiquidity pre-
mium associated with liquidation restrictions of hedge funds (see [17], [18]).
In case of transaction costs, a theoretical definition of illiquidity premium was
given by Constantinides (1986) [19]. But, there is no commonly accepted way
in academia to define an illiquidity premium that an investor should be given
because of additional restrictions. In this section, a general formulation of a con-
straint premium will be given. The approach was initially designed to address
the problem of defining and efficiently calculating lockup premiums of institu-
tional investors. However, this approach can also be applied to a great range of
terminal utility maximization problems with a finite number of securities and
no market impact.
First, the general portfolio construction problem will be defined. The def-
initions are be presented in the most general, abstract setting to expose their
underlying economic reasoning. Next, I will add constraints to the model and
discuss how to transform it back to the un-constrained setting by penalizing the
expected returns of the underlying assets. Based on the gained intuition, I will
define a premium the investor should be given to be indifferent between the
constrained and un-constrained models. The derived definitions and method-
ology will be used in the next chapter to measure the lockup premium of hedge
funds.
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We are given a filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) where T can also
be infinite.
Exogenous Process: S
An investor has access to a finite number of securities:
S = {Sit |Sit : Ω→ R, adapted to Ft, E(Sit) = µit <∞, i = 1, ..., n, t ∈ [0, T ]} .
(3.1)
Some or all of the securities might be risky and at this point I do not assume any
particular evolution on Sit except that it has a finite expectation. In other words,
S represents the stochastic part of our model over which the investor has no
control. I denote the column vector {Sit , i = 1, ..., n} by St and the row vector of
{µit, i = 1, ..., n} by µt.
Control Process: A
The investor controls the weights of each asset Sit in her portfolio with a
control process αit,
∑n
i=1 α
i
t = 1. At each time t, the weights αt = {α1t , ..., αnt }
are in a region At which represents the set of actions the investor can take to
re-balance her portfolio up to time t and for convenience I will drop T in AT .
Cost Function: C : A× C
Suppose, there is also a cost function C defined on S×A that results from the
actions of the investor while re-balancing her portfolio. The cost function must
be non-negative.
Utility Functional: U
Denote by U the utility functional of the investor. The functional can be a
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utility function, an integral of instantaneous utility function and vary through
time, but I define here it in an abstract sense. The only requirement is that the
function is non-decreasing depending on the cost-adjusted profit of the investor.
I also assume that the functional U includes the adjustment for the discount rate
when applicable.
Constant Initial Values: I
I store all the constant initial values of the model at time t in It. For example,
the values S0 and α0 in I0 := I will represent the initial values of the assets and
the initial portfolio allocation weights.
Optimal Portfolio Allocation Problem: Classical Framework
Given the model M consisting of the frameworkM = {S,A, C, U} and the
initial values I, the problem of the investor at time 0 is to find an optimal ad-
missible control α ∈ A in order to maximize:
JM(I, α) = E(U(STαT − C(αT , ST ))), (3.2)
We denote the optimal terminal value function by:
VM(I) = sup
α∈A
E(U(STαT − C(αT , ST ))), (3.3)
and for a given model M consisting of the frameworkM and initial values
I, we denote:
VM = VM(I). (3.4)
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For example, if the cost functional C ≡ 0, the problem can be reduced to the
standard Stochastic Control framework that is discussed in e.g. Pham (2009).
The case C ≡ 0 represents the problem of optimal portfolio construction with
no transaction costs, no consumption and can incorporate models of Merton
(1969) if the assets follow a Geometrical Brownian Motion, or the model de-
scribed in Elliott and Siu (2009), in case the stochastic process follows a Marko-
vian Regime-Switching Model. On the other hand, if the control set A in any
given interval [0, t) consists of finite number of points, our framework reduces
to classical Impulse Control problem as in Oksendal and Sulem (2008), Carmona
and Ludkovski (2007), Baccarin and Marazzina (2014) and can be used to model
the problem with transaction costs as in Korn (1998), Morton and Pliska (1993),
Constantinindes (1986).
In the classical literature (e.g. Shreve and Soner (1994), Constantinindes
(1986)), to solve the optimal portfolio allocation problem, the value function
VM is usually described as a function of the initial values It at time t. The latter
is done in order to reduce the time-range of the problem and apply the dynamic
programming principle. However, I will take a different approach and consider
the value function from an alternative perspective.
3.2 The Constrained Model
Define models Mi(p) = {Mi(p), I}, i = 1, ..., n as versions of the model
M = {M, I} where the only difference is that the expectation of the ith asset
is multiplied by a scalar p ∈ (0,∞) and is equal to pµit. Similarly, we define
modelsM(p) = {M(p), I} as versions of the modelM = {M, I}where the only
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difference is that the expectation of all the asset is scaled by a parameter p.
I consider the value functions:
VMi(p) := VMi(p)(I) (3.5)
VM(p) := VM(p)(I) (3.6)
I will use those notations interchangeably in cases when the defini-
tion/properties hold for both of the cases. For simplicity, lets for the moment
assume that µit is constant. Intuitively, we are interested in answering the ques-
tion of what will happen to the optimal investor’s terminal wealth if we keep
everything the same except increase and/or decrease the expected return of one
of its assets. Of course, in real-world scenario we would expect the function
VMi(p) to be non-decreasing. In the mathematical framework, assuming exis-
tence and uniqueness of the value function and some regularity, by keeping in
mind that U is non-decreasing, one could also expect the function VM(µ) to be
non-decreasing.
Definition 3.2.1 (Constrained Model). We call a model M′ = {{S,A′, C ′,U} , I}
a constrained version of model M = {{S,A, C,U} , I} and denote by M  M′ if the
following two conditions hold:
1) Action Constraint: A′ ⊆ A
2) Cost Constraint: C ′ ≥ C
In such a case we call the A′ and C ′ to be the additional constraints imposed on M.
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As we can see, the constrained model is the one where the investor has to
pay larger (or equal) fees for the same portfolio re-balancing operations and for
which the admissible set of re-balancing decisions of the investor is smaller (or
equal).
Corollary 3.2.1. If M′ is a constrained version of the model M, assuming the existence
and uniqueness of the functions VM(p) and VM′(p), the following relation holds:
VM(p) ≥ VM′(p) (3.7)
Proof. The proof immediately follows by combining the property of supremum
with the fact that U is non-decreasing: for any control α ∈ A′, α ∈ A and
E(U(STαT − C ′(αT , ST ))) ≤ E(U(STαT − C(αT , ST ))).
Definition 3.2.2 (Cost of the Constraints). We call the quantityC{A′,C′} := VM−VM′
the cost that the investor in modelM carries because of the additional constraintsA′ and
C ′.
As we see from the corollary, the cost of a constraint for an investor is al-
ways nonnegative. If we suppose that A = A′ and C ≡ 0 then our cost of the
constraints definition reduces to the one given by Constantinindes (1986), where
he defined the liquidity premium of a transaction cost to be the maximum ex-
pected return an investor is willing to exchange for zero transaction costs. In
our analysis, though, I will mainly consider the case when A′ ⊂ A and C = C ′.
Next, suppose that the constraints A′ and C ′ are only applied to the trading of
the security i.
Definition 3.2.3 (The Constraint Premium). For a given model M and its con-
strained version M′, if there exists a scalar p such that
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VM(p) = VM′ , (3.8)
then I call the quantity µ(1− p) the liquidity premium of the constraints A′ and C ′.
Note that the constraint premium is the adjustment that should be made to
the average returns of the securities, so that the investor with a given utility is
indifferent between the model M with returns µ− p and the constrained model
M′ with real-world returns. We can think of it asA′ and C ′ transform the uncon-
strained model to the constrained one and by penalizing the expected returns I
transform it back, as presented in the equation, below:
{M, µ} →A′,C′→ {M′, µ} →µ′=pµ→ {M, µ′} (3.9)
This framework enables us to compute premiums of different constraints
and combine all that in the initial unconstrained model. However, one can note
that it is possible to define a constrained premium if:
∃p s.t. VM(p) = VM′(1), from where we get that µ′ = pµ. (3.10)
I will address the existence of such p in some specific cases when VM′(p) can
be proven to be increasing.
Example: Merton Portfolio Construction Model
To see what type of shape to expect from the function VM(p) I simulated it in case
of Merton Portfolio for an investor with CRRA utility function with elasticity
γ = 0.5, parameters σ = 0.2, r = 0.02, T = 4 and the time 0 investment of 1.
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In this example I assume no consumption and that there exist one risky and
one riskless asset defined by the following two equations:
dS0t = rS
0
t dt, (3.11)
dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt. (3.12)
The wealth process is given by:
dXt =
Xtαt
St
dSt +
Xt(1− αt)
S0t
dS0t , (3.13)
and the Value function is defined by:
V (t, x) = sup
α∈A
E[U(X t,xT ).] (3.14)
For the CRRA(0.5) utility function: U(X) = X0.5/0.5, the explicit solution
and the optimal wealth process (see Pham (2009)) is:
dXt = Xt(α
′µ+ (1− α′)r)dt+Xtα′σdWt, (3.15)
α′ = 2
(µ− r)2
σ2
, (3.16)
and the terminal utility is:
V (0, 1) = 2 exp(ρT ), where ρ =
(µ− r)2
2σ2
+
r
2
. (3.17)
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From where I generate the terminal utility function for different scaling param-
eters p and plot it in 3.1, below.
Figure 3.1: No-Transaction Cost Merton Model: VM(p)
As we can see from the figure, the terminal value increases exponentially as p in-
creases. So, for this model I will be able to apply the definitions of the premium
of a constraint.
In case that approximating such a p is numerically unfeasible, I will use an al-
ternative definition of the constraint premium from the point of view of average
returns. Note that if VM and VM′ can be uniquely determined, then there exist
average rate of returns α, α′ such that eαT = VM and eα
′T = VM′ . Since VM′ ≤ VM,
we will also have α − α′ = log VM−log VM′
T
≥ 0 and the constraints A, C are the
only reason of the decrease of the relative rate of return. Hence, we can use the
following definition:
Definition 3.2.4 (The Constraint Premium Rate). We call the quantity log VM−log VM′
T
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the Constraint Premium Rate that the investor in model M carries because of the addi-
tional constraints A′ and C ′.
As we will see in the next section, exploring the functions VM(p) and VM′(p)
might be useful in finding analogues of continuous time policies in discrete-time
setting. Suppose the only restriction ofM ′ is that the investor can re-balance her
portfolio on pre-determined dates. Unfortunately, the explicit solutions of the
continuous-time Optimal Portfolio Construction problems are not necessarily
optimal if applied discretely. The reason is that the continuous time solutions
were designed in a setting where continuous re-balancing was possible. How-
ever, if we can find VM(p) explicitly and VM′(p) through a comparatively slow nu-
merical iteration, we could compute VM′(p) for a few points and use the inverse
relation with VM(p) in order to approximate the values of VM′(p) on some closed
interval. The methodology will be applied to the Markov-Switching framework
and described in more details in the next section.
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CHAPTER 4
LOCKUP AS A LOST INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY
4.1 Introduction
Money managers typically have agreements with their investors specifying a fee
structure and redemption rules of the investments. The redemption rules usu-
ally include share restrictions such as lockup and notice periods. A lockup in-
dicates the time period during which the investor cannot withdraw any money
from the money manager. A notice period is the amount of the time the investor
has to provide before withdrawing her money. Share restrictions are specific to
each agreement and might also include conditions on the fraction of the initial
investment that can be withdrawn at once.
Lockup restrictions are particularly useful for money managers that invest
in more illiquid assets (see for example [20]). Aragon (2007) [17] argues that the
share restrictions allow funds to manage illiquid assets more efficiently. Studies
by Bali, Gockan and Liang (2007) [21] , Ackerman, McEnally and Ravenscraft
(1999) [22] and Liang(1999) [23] suggest that the hedge funds that have lockup
periods have higher expected returns than the ones that don’t. But, studies
conducted by Aragon (2007) also show that, after controlling for share restric-
tions, on average the alpha of all hedge funds is either negative or insignificant.
Hence, one can argue that the expected returns of the money managers with
greater share restrictions are significantly higher because of the illiquidity risk
the share restrictions bear. But, the classic optimal portfolio allocation models
do not account for such an illiquidity risk and might be tricked by the resulting
high expected returns.
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Literature Review:
There are not many studies in academia that address the problem of esti-
mating the lockup illiquidity premium of Hedge Funds. After an extensive aca-
demic research on the topic, I found only three not purely empirical papers
that address the question of illiquidity premiums in Hedge Funds. Ang and
Bollen (2010) [24] model lockup premium by considering it as an option exer-
cised when the investor’s own valuation of a share of ownership in the Hedge
Fund falls below the fund’s reported NAV. The model assumes that the investor
is sophisticated enough to take into account the probability of fund failure, liq-
uidation costs and the impact of the future exercise decisions. That approach
might be applicable in cases when the Hedge Funds invest in assets that are
very illiquid or for which market prices are not available and Hedge Fund’s
NAV report might be biased. The authors also take into account fund failures
which they are calculating by looking at the time when Hedge Funds stopped
reporting their performance. However, Hedge Funds stopping reporting of
their NAVs might be connected with many other reasons, one of them being
investor fund outflows. Also, as noted by Derman et al. (2008) [25], dead funds
are not of a large concern for investors with lockups, since if the Hedge Fund is
dead, then the investors will be paid independently from the fact whether there
was a lockup or not. Ang and Bollen (2010) do not consider the more complex
question of calculating the lockup premium in a context of a full-scale asset al-
location problem. The reason they state is that for small institutional investors,
because of the minimum investment requirements in Hedge Funds, the deci-
sion is to typically remain invested in a given Hedge Fund or fully liquidate the
position and withdraw the capital as cash. If we consider this in the framework
of optimal asset allocation, while also taking into account the constraint on the
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minimum investment requirements, the approach of Ang and Bollen (2010) can
be treated as modeling the special case when an investor is choosing between
holding the Hedge Fund or a risk-free asset. From the financial perspective
one can treat it as an investor looking at the absolute performance of a Hedge
Fund while making a liquidation decision. The latter is a special case of our
approach, when we assume that apart from a given Hedge Fund, the investor
has only access to a risk-free asset.
In our opinion, the assumption that the institutional investor can calculate
the NAV of an illiquid asset more accurately than the Hedge Fund manager
and can spot the misreporting might not be realistic. It assumes a high level
of sophistication from the investor’s side, information about exactly what type
of assets the Hedge Fund holds and expertise in those assets to the level that
will enable the investor to price them more realistically. Besides, for the major-
ity of the assets the prices are available publicly. But, even in such a case the
Hedge Fund would not necessarily reveal its holdings to the investor so that
the latter can re-calculate the NAV. Hence, I consider the question of the NAV
misreporting as irrelevant in the calculation of the lockup premium.
A different approach to model lockups was proposed by Derman, Park and
Whitt (2008), who estimated the lockup by comparing a given Hedge Fund with
an extended lockup with a Hedge Fund with one year lockup. They look only
at similar funds in the same strategy category and use a discrete-time 3-state
process for their estimation. The authors note that their definition of illiquid-
ity does not account for other investment opportunities that the investor lost
because of the lockup. A generalization of the model of Derman et al. (2008)
is done by Park and Whitt (2013), where the authors consider a similar 3-state
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Markov Process but in continuous time setting. In that paper as well the au-
thors note that they did not fully account for lost investment opportunities that
resulted because of the lockup premium. However, the authors of those two
papers define and use the idea of good and bad state in relation to the average
return rate for Hedge Funds in a given strategy category. Again, if we consider
this in the framework of asset allocation, we can treat is as an investor choos-
ing between a given Hedge Fund and comparing it with the benchmark. So,
what these approaches actually do is mainly taking into account a subset of lost
investment opportunities, those within a given category of funds and in a special
case.
The Proposed Approach:
It is reasonable to assume that the Hedge Fund portfolio managers are more
knowledgeable in the assets in which they invest, compared to the institutional
investor. So, assuming there is no conflict of interest, portfolio managers can
make better predictions on market timing and can partially liquidate institu-
tional investor’s portfolio when there is a significant downside risk or not many
good opportunities in the market. Moreover, lockups might protect against fire-
selling behavior of non-sophisticated investors and as noted by Aragon (2007)
might help funds to manage their illiquid portfolios more efficiently. As a result,
I argue that the lockup premium should only be measured as a premium for the
lost investment opportunities of the institutional investor.
Apart from returns relative to the benchmark or relative to the similar classes
of funds, investors also look at the absolute returns of the fund and the relative
returns of the fund in connection with the other fund classes. For example, if
the Hedge Funds which are invested in Emerging Markets are projected not to
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perform well compared to the Hedge Funds or Mutual Funds in the US equities,
then the institutional investor might decide to re-allocate her assets from the
Emerging Markets. So, the main risk that an investor with a lockup faces is the
inability to re-balance her portfolio by reinvesting the money: in a fund of a
same class, in a fund from a different class or in a riskless asset.
Based on the aforementioned intuition, I construct models to measure the illiq-
uidity premium of the hedge fund lockups. I model the lockups in the context of
an optimal portfolio construction problem. To be able to measure the illiquid-
ity premium independent from the choice of a specific portfolio construction
approach, I model it for the optimal investor. The latter is done using the con-
straint reduction framework from the previous section.
Thus, I assume that the institutional investor makes a decision to invest the part
of her money in a given Hedge Fund with some fixed lockup period. She also
has access to a riskless asset, Hedge Funds of a similar class and the general
market that is available to institutional investors. The investor has some utility
function and tries to optimize her utility over a finite period of time [0, T ].
First, I model the hedge fund lockups in the framework of proportional trans-
action costs. After, I consider the problem in the Markov-Switching case. Due
to the restrictions to access the Hedge Fund returns data, I am not able to im-
plement the proposed models. However, we also construct a simplified frame-
work to model the cost of lockups and by using the data on hedge fund in-
dexes, I approximate lockup premium values for different type of funds. Also,
I demonstrate the dependence of the lockup premium on the chosen portfolio
construction model by examining it for 4 optimal portfolio construction cases.
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4.2 Lockup Premium: Optimal Investor
We are given a complete filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) that satisfies
the usual hypothesis as presented in Protter [26]. T represents the investment
horizon of the institutional investor and can be any positive real number, but
for convenience I assume that T is the amount of time in months. Assume that
an institutional investor invests H1(0) > 0 dollars in a given Hedge Fund that
has lockup restrictions of L < T months and let k := T/L be a positive integer.
In case of lockups the investor is allowed to re-balance her portfolio at times
L, 2L, ..., kL
Suppose that the institutional investor has access to one riskless and 3 risky
assets:
• Riskless Asset: H0(t) evolves according to H0(t) = h0ert
• Hedge Fund: H1(t) represents the evolution of the NAV of the given Hedge
Fund
• Hedge Fund Style: H2(t) represents the evolution of the NAV of a hedge
fund style that H1 is in. That is, H2(t) represents the overall evolution
(benchmark) of a given Hedge Fund style
• Market: H3(t) represents the average NAV evolution of all the assets avail-
able to the investor in the economy: that is the average of NAV’s over all
Mutual and Hedge Funds available to the institutional investor.
The risky assetsHi(t) t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, 3 are adapted to (Ft)t∈[0,T ] and evolve
according to a Geometric Brownian Motion:
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dHi(t)
Hi(t)
= µidt+ σidWi(t) (4.1)
Also, suppose that µi’s are already adjusted for the fixed and incentive fees of
the HF, HFs style or the HFs/MFs market. Note that I also assume that H2(0) =
0 and H3(0) = 0, that is, at time 0 the assets 2 and 3 play a role of investment
opportunities that the investor did not use, yet. Wi(t) can be correlated and
we denote the correlation matrix of Wi by (ρi,j). The correlation of the HF with
other HFs of that style is probably higher and the volatility of a given hedge
fund might also be higher than the volatility of the HF style index. So, we expect
ρ1,j and σ(j) to decrease as j increases. Also, we assume µi > r, that is net of
fees MFs/HFs perform better than the riskless asset.
I assume that there are proportional transaction costs and adjust the model
proposed by Liu and Lowenstein (2002) for our purposes. That is, suppose
that Bi(t) and Si(t) are Ft adapted processes and represent the total amount
of money spent on buying/selling the asset i by time t. I assume that those
processes are non-decreasing, right continuous and start at 0. I will discuss two
cases separately, in case of no lockups, the values of Bi(t) and Si(t) will be de-
fined on [0, T ] and in case of lockups they will be defined on t = L, 2L, ..., kL,
which will be the discrete version of our continuous time model.
Hedge funds also impose notice periods which have a typical length of a
few months. As I have discussed in the previous section, lockups disadvantage
institutional investors because of the lost investment opportunities rather than
market-timing and fire-liquidation constraints. For an efficient liquidation of a
large portfolio, the liquidation orders should be spread days or weeks apart. A
fast liquidation of a large position might be costly on the investor’s side and
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waiting period of a few months is a reasonable time-frame, which is also negli-
gible in comparison with the long-horizon of institutional investors. As a result,
we think that explicitly modeling costs of notice periods in our model is an un-
necessary complication. However, I will model the notice periods as a constraint
on rebalancing in our model. It is realistic to assume that over a long horizon
investor’s average return cannot exceed 50% per year. Hence, the upper bound
on investor’s terminal return is equal to e0.5T . Now for K = 1
N
e0.5Tds, note that∫ t+N
t
K = e0.5T . So, I restrict the set of admissible policies to the form:
Bi(t) =
∫ t
0
bi(u)du and Si(t) =
∫ t
0
si(u)du, where bi(u) < K, si(u) < K. (4.2)
Also, let 1 > λi > 0 be the proportional transaction cost that the investor
carries while buying and selling the asset i. Hence, the money the investor has
in asset i will evolve according to the following equation:
dMi(t)
Mi(t)
= µidt+ σidWi(t) + dBi(t)− dSi(t) (4.3)
and the money in the riskless asset would hence be equal to:
dM0(t) = rM0(t)dt−
3∑
i=1
(1 + λi)dBi(t) +
3∑
i=1
(1− λi)dSi(t). (4.4)
Hence, the investor’s net wealth at time t i.e. the wealth if all the positions
were immediately liquidated, is equal to:
M(t) = M0(t) +
3∑
i=1
Mi(t)(IMi(t)>0(1− λi)− IMi(t)<0(1 + λi)). (4.5)
112
Denote by S the set {m0,m1,m2,m3} ∈ R4 wherem0(t)+
∑3
i=1 mi(t)(Imi>0(1−
λi) + Imi<0(1 + λi)) > 0. We will call S the solvency region, that is when the
investor’s net wealth is positive. We call a buy/sell strategy Bi(t), Si(t) admis-
sible from time s, if Ms = m > 0 and {M0(t), ...,M3(t)} ∈ S and denote the set of
all such strategies by A(s, w). Hence, our institutional investor’s problem is to
maximize the quantity:
sup
Si,Bi∈A(0,H0(0))
E0[e
−rTU(MT )], (4.6)
from where we can define the value function:
V (t,m) = sup
{Bi,Si}∈A(t,m)
Et[e
−rTU(MT )|Mt = m]. (4.7)
Optimal Value Function without a Lockup Constraint
In the continuous-time case for CRRA utility function: U(m) = m
γ
γ
for γ > 0
and U(m) = log(m) for γ = 0, Shreve and Soner (1994) showed that the value
function satisfies the HJB equation:
max
{
∂V
∂t
+ LV , max
i=1,2,3
S0iV, max
i=1,2,3
B0iV
}
= 0, (4.8)
on the solvency region for t ∈ [0, T ), and terminal function:
V (T,m) = U(m0 +
3∑
i=1
mi(Imi>0(1− λi) + Imi<0(1 + λi)) > 0). (4.9)
where,
LV = 1
2
∑
3≥i,j≥1
ρijσiσjmimj
∂2V
∂mi∂mj
+
3∑
i=1
∂V
∂mi
+ rm0
∂V
∂m0
− rV (4.10)
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S0iV = −(1 + λi) ∂V
∂m0
+
∂V
∂mi
, B0iV = (1− λi) ∂V
∂m0
− ∂V
∂mi
(4.11)
These type of problems can be solved numerically using Penalty Method
(Karatzas, Shreve (1984)) or also formulated into impulse control problem and
solved using Monte-Carlo regressions (Carmona, Ludkovski (2007)). I will use
penalty method as proposed by Dai and Zhong (2010). Applying the method of
Dai and Zhong (2010) and keeping in mind the restrictions on Bi(t), Si(t) we get
that the initial problem is equivalent to finding:
−∂W
∂t
− LW = K
3∑
i=1
[(BiW )+ + (SW )+] (4.12)
W (y, T ) = log(1−
3∑
i=1
λi(y
+
i + y
−
i )) (4.13)
where the latter is an approximation of the original problem restricted to
admissible policies of the form Bi(t) =
∫ t
0
bi(u)du and Si(u) =
∫ t
0
si(u)du.
This problem can be solved by using finite difference discretization of a trun-
cated domain in R3. I use upwind scheme for the first order partial derivatives
and a scheme originally proposed by Oksendal and Sulem (2005) for 2nd order
derivatives.
Optimal Value Function with a Lockup Constraint
In the discrete-time setting, the multi-asset portfolio allocation model with
proportional transaction costs can be solved by approximate dynamic program-
ming (ADP) methods. Cai, Judd and Xu (2013) demonstrated tractable numer-
ical methods using ADP to solve the problem for up to 6 risky assets. Shen
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and Wang (2015), proposed an even faster method that is based on theoretical
findings of the shape of the non-trading region. The authors claim that their
numerical methods based on the Fast Lo¨wner-John Ellipsoid Approximation
significantly cut the computational costs. The equations in the discrete time set-
ting are analogous to the continuous time case, with the only difference that t
spans the discrete points 0, L, ..., kL.
ADP as in Cai, Judd and Xu (2013) will suffice our case and I shortly describe
the ADP approach, below:
• constructing grid points using Sobol low-discrepancy numbers
• approximate the value functions with Chebyshev Polynomials (spectral
method)
• use Gauss-Hermite quadrature for efficient calculation of conditional ex-
pectations
• iteratively-maximize the value function
After computing the value functions, I use the definition of the constraint pre-
mium of the previous section to implement the lockup premium for our case.
The implementations were done in Matlab. Unfortunately, at the time of this
research, to the best of our knowledge Cornell University was not subscribed
to any Hedge Fund databases (such as TASS or Morningstar). Because of that, I
was not able to apply our theoretical model on the hedge fund return data.
Lockup Premium: Markov-Switching Framework
In this section, I discuss how to model the lockup premium in the Markov-
Switching framework. The Markov-Switching framework was chosen because
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it best addresses the issue of the structural changes in the expected returns of
the funds. For example, suppose that after monitoring a given hedge fund class,
the institutional investor notes that the expected returns changed to a different
state and the whole hedge fund style under-performs. Those type of return
evolutions are easily captured in the Markov-Switching framework. Besides,
the investment horizon of an institutional investor is typically quite long and
the Markov-Switching framework is suitable for long-horizon modeling, too
(see e.g. Hardy (2001), Freeland, Hardy and Till (2009), Hamilton (2010), Bulla
(2011)).
As in the previous section, we have 3 risky assets which represent a given hedge
fund, the hedge fund style and the market. In addition, we have 1 riskless asset
and a 4-state Markov-Chain describing the changes of the underlying expected
returns of the risky assets. To model the lockup premium in this situation, I
adjust the setup and use the results obtained by Canakoglu and Ozekici (2009,
2012).
The evolution of the risky assets in the given framework are modeled by the
following equation:
dHk(t) = µk(i)Hk(t)dt+Hk(t)
3∑
j=1
σkjdWj(t), (4.14)
i = 1, .., 4, k = 1, .., 3.
From where, the wealth evolves according to:
dXut =
m∑
k=1
uk(t)
dHk(t)
Hk(t)
+ (Xut −
m∑
k=1
uk(t))
dB(t)
B(t)
. (4.15)
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In this case the Value functions V (x, t) is:
V (x, t) = sup
u∈A
E1[U(YT , X
u
T )] (4.16)
For the HARA utility function, Canakoglu and Ozekici (2012) provide explicit
solutions for the continuous-time case. For the discrete-time case a numerical
solution is provided in Canakoglu and Ozekici (2009). Combining those results
with the methodology developed in the previous chapter, I compute the illiq-
uidity premium. I use the definition 3.8 of the premium of a constraint. For
simplicity, let us assume that we have an investor with an exponential utility
function U(x) = 1− e−x. Then, the expectation of the optimal wealth in uncon-
strained (Continuous-Time) and Constrained (Discrete-Time) cases are:
Continuous-Time Case:
E1(X
∗
T ) = x0e
rT +me(p), where me = p2me(1) (4.17)
Discrete-Time Case:
E1[X
∗
T ] = x0r
T +me(p), where me(p) = p2me(1) (4.18)
The dependence on p is not explicit in the terminal value function: V (x0, 0) =
1− E1[e−X∗T ], so I estimate it using Monte-Carlo simulations and Taylor Expan-
sion. The implementation is done in Matlab (running time ≈ 2 minutes) for
a sample data set built based on the appendix in the Canakoglu and Ozekici
(2010). In the figure 4.1 we can see that the expected optimal utility increases in
both constrained and un-constrained frameworks. The latter enables us to com-
pute the constraint premium using the definition 3.8. Because I used a ”ran-
dom” data set, the results don’t represent an actual value of a lockup premium.
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Figure 4.1: Application of the Regime-Switching Model
Number of Markov-Chain States: 4, Number of Risky Assets: 3, Investment Horizon: 4
years, Length of the Lockups in Years: 2, Wealth at Time 0: 1, Mean of the Returns in
Different States: µ = [1.05 1.04 1.03; 1.04 1.031.05; 1.03 1.04 1.05; 1.05 1.03 1.04],
Covariance Matrix: σ = [2.425 1.809 0.607; 1.809 5.990 0.684; 0.607 0.684 1.893], The
Markov-Switching Matrix:
Q = [0.6 0.3 0.05 0.05; 0.05 0.6 0.3 0.05; 0.05 0.3 0.6 0.05; 0.05 0.05 0.3 0.6].
However, the results demonstrate the possibility to numerically compute the
lockup premium in the proposed Markov-Switching framework.
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4.3 Lockup Premium: Simplified Framework
Based on the work by Gushchin, Trikoz and Verdiyan (2014)
In this section we will introduce a simplified framework to measure the illiq-
uidity premium of the hedge fund lockups. The motivation is to simplify the
model in a way to be able to implement it on the type of the data which we have
access to, which is the data on different hedge fund index returns.
Throughout the chapter, we will use the phrases “illiquidity premium in-
duced by share restrictions” and “illiquidity premium”, interchangeably. Our
definition of the illiquidity premium enables us to compare it with the yearly re-
turn rates of different asset classes. This section also models portfolios similar to
those of large endowments, such as Yale and MIT, which outsource most of their
investing to outside managers. We measure the lockup illiquidity premium an
endowment receives for taking on illiquidity risk through money managers in
asset classes such as Hedge Funds (Absolute Return), Private Equity and For-
eign Equity. To compute the illiquidity premium in the cases above, we add
more structure and assumptions on the dynamics of the asset movements.
We are given a complete filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) that satis-
fies the usual hypothesis as presented in Protter [26]. T can be any positive real
number, but for convenience we assume that T is the amount of time in months.
Denote by rt the default-free spot rate of interest that is adapted toFt and is inte-
grable. We consider a long-horizon investor with a utility function U(·) that has
an access to a riskless asset described by a process X0(t) = e
∫ t
0 rsds and n money
managers investing in different asset classes. The investor has a fixed amount of
money V at time 0 and wants to construct a portfolio P to maximize its expected
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utility at time T . We denote byXi(t) the investment return process of the money
manager i and assume that the measurable index set Ii ∈ [0, T ] includes all the
times at which it is possible to put a withdrawal notification. We assume that
Xi(t) are semimartingales adapted to Ft. Let us denote the constant length of
the notice period of the money manager i byNi ≥ 0. Money managers investing
in more illiquid asset classes usually have longer lockup periods. Note that in
our model we can also have money managers with no share restrictions. Those
will be the ones for whom Ni = 0 and Ii = [0, T ]. We will say those money
managers are liquid.
The standard notion of self-financing trading strategies is not applicable
in this framework, since we cannot short money managers. Continuous re-
balancing of the portfolio is also not possible due to notice periods and share
restrictions. Even in case of liquid money managers, frequent inflow/outflow
of money is not realistic since it might not allow them to maintain a specific
trading strategy. So, we can expect the re-balancing to be infrequent even when
all the chosen money managers are liquid. Motivated by the aforementioned,
we describe the actions of our long-horizon investor at times (0, T ] by a finite
number of decisions to re-balance the portfolio. Our aim is to find a defini-
tion for share restrictions illiquidity premium, so that it does not depend on
the availability of the money managers to an investor. Because of it, we make
a simplifying assumption that if the investor decides to withdraw the money
from the manager i, he will put that money in the riskless asset and hold it there
until time T . Next, we define a notion of a restricted stopping time.
Definition 4.3.1. Given the measurable index set I ⊆ [0, T ] , we denote byR[I] the set
of all random variables τ taking values in I such that {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft. We call elements
ofR[I] restricted stopping times.
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Next, after denoting byR the space (R[I1], ...,R[In]), we can define the opti-
mal investor problem:
The Investor Problem: At time 0, find the optimal allocation of money V
into n money managers and a riskless asset: V0,...,Vn (where Vi ≥ 0 for i ≥ 1 and
V0 + ...+ Vn = V ), so that to maximize the value of
sup
τ∈R
EP
[
U
(
V0e
∫ T
0 rsds +
n∑
i=1
ViXi(τi +Ni)e
∫ T
τi+Ni
rsds
)
|F0
]
(4.19)
Using our notations, the expected cost an investor carries because of the
share restrictions of the money manager i is:
Ci = Vi
(
sup
τi∈R[0,1]
EP [Xi(τi +Ni)e
∫ T
τi+Ni
rsds]− sup
τi∈R[Ii]
EP [Xi(τi +Ni)e
∫ T
τi+Ni
rsds]
)
(4.20)
In choosing a way to define share restrictions illiquidity premium in our
theoretical framework we were motivated by the following intuition. We should
be able to compare it with the yearly interest rates and the yearly returns of other
assets. So, we should scale appropriately for the starting investment amount
and for the time to the end of our investment period T . As a result, we define
the predicted yearly illiquidity premium of money manager i to be:
pi =
(
1 +
Ci
Vi
)12/T
− 1. (4.21)
Note that the previous equation can be rewritten as:
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pi =
(
1 + sup
τi∈R[0,1]
EP [Xi(τi +Ni)e
∫ T
τi+Ni
rsds]− sup
τi∈R[Ii]
EP [Xi(τi +Ni)e
∫ T
τi+Ni
rsds]
)12/T
−1.
(4.22)
As we can see, the illiquidity premium does not depend on the initial port-
folio allocation choice Vi. Besides, (1 + pi)
T
12 − 1 = Ci
Vi
represents the expected
fraction of loss for each invested dollar. Hence, our definition is indeed compa-
rable with yearly returns and interest rates. We call the illiquidity premium pi
“predicted” since we can compute it for the time-period [0, T ], standing at time
0. Also note that the illiquidity premium defined above is from a perspective of
an optimal investor and can be used as an absolute measure of illiquidity.
Notes on Data Collection:
We use as our input data indices and composites that the endowments them-
selves use to track their performance. These would serve as inputs to our model
that would mimic the actual endowment allocations. The selection of the indices
was based on analysis of asset allocations of Yale, Harvard and MIT and their
respective benchmarks for hedge funds, private equity and real estate pools.
These are published in the endowment updates online [27]. Once the index se-
lection was finalized, the data was downloaded. For publicly managed data,
the indices are readily available through Bloomberg terminal. In cases where
the endowment used a custom in-house benchmark, an approximation of that
benchmark was made with an available index. For private equity and real es-
tate, we used Cambridge Associates return aggregates published on their web-
site.
Below is the list of indices that were used for each asset class: Domestic Equity
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(RAY Index: RUSSELL 3000 Index), Foreign Equity (SPBMUMUT Index: S&P
Developed Ex-U.S. BMI MidCap TR), Emerging Markets Equity (SCRTEM In-
dex: S&P Emerging BMI), Absolute Return (HEDGNAV Index: Credit Suisse
Hedge Fund Index (Tremont Composite)), Real Estate (Cambridge Composite:
Real Estate Index [28]), US Private Equity (Cambridge Composite: U.S. Private
Equity Index [29]), Fixed Income (3 year treasury yields from the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury [30]), Cash (Yearly LIBOR rate [31]).
Cambridge Associates PE Composite returns are quarterly returns. Actual
Private Equity returns don’t behave like any Private Equity index and in fact,
are closer related to a hedge fund index for Absolute Return. Further research
backs up this conclusion: the nature of the private equity asset class prevents
a construction of a replicable benchmark. Towers Watson reports that the “the
lack of a readily available universe of transactions and assets makes it challeng-
ing to construct a replicable index. As such, there is no recognized index that
captures the entire opportunity set available to private equity managers. [32]”
The timing of the cash flows in private equity is unpredictable and often, the
private equity universe cannot be defined.
Implementation:
In order to run simulations and compute the desired illiquidity premium, we
need to assume some dynamics on the underlying processes. Money managers
usually can be grouped by types of strategies and the asset classes they invest
in. There are also some indices that track average performance statistics of dif-
ferent categories of money managers. A widely used approach in academia and
in industry is to model price processes of equities and indices by a Geometric
Brownian Motion. Our framework allows us to use more advanced dynamics
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such as the double-exponential jump diffusions (see [33], [34]), time-changed
Brownian motions (see [35]) or affine jump-diffusion models (see [36]). How-
ever, to ease computational tractability we will also assume that our risky assets
follow a Geometric Brownian motion. Parameters such as the correlation ma-
trix, mean returns and volatility are found from the historical data and will be
discussed later.
Let the values µ0, ..., µn be the per-period returns of our assets. So, in the
continuous time framework our riskless asset will grow by the formula:
X0(t) = exp((t)ln(1 + µ0)) (4.23)
Suppose, the assets in our portfolio P are described by the following SDE
dXi(t) = ln(1 + µi)Xi(t)dt+Xi(t)
n∑
j=1
σi,jdWj(t). (4.24)
where i = 1, .., n and we assume that the n × n matrix σ with entries σi,j in
invertible.
The latter evolution in the literature is described as a special case of the Mul-
tidimensional Market Model ( [37], p.226). We will modify it to fit our theoretical
framework. It is easy to see that (4.24) can be rewritten as:
dX(t) = µX(t)dt+ I(X(t))σdW (t) (4.25)
whereX(t), µ, dW (t) are the vectors ofXi(t), ln(1+µi), dWi(t), appropriately,
σ is the matrix σi,j and I(X(t)) is a matrix with vector X(t) on its diagonal. The
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notice periods are usually standard and much shorter than the lockup periods,
so for our particular example we will assume Ni = 0.
In the described framework, the predicted illiquidity premium for money
manager i is:
pi =
(
1 + sup
τi∈R[0,1]
EP [Xi(τi)e
∫ T
τi
rsds]− sup
τi∈R[Ii]
EP [Xi(τi)e
∫ T
τi
rsds]
)12/T
− 1. (4.26)
Results: For implementation, we first determined the historical returns, corre-
lations and volatilities of our assets given the data for years 2001-2013. Next,
with those inputs we simulated correlated Geometric Brownian Motions for the
next 6 years. For the implementation of the Geometric Brownian Motions we
heavily used the Econometrics and Financial Toolboxes of Matlab. We imple-
mented Monte Carlo simulations to find the values of the predicted illiquidity
premiums for different asset classes. To simulate restricted/unrestricted stop-
ping times, we created various rules when to sell the asset. Those rules com-
prised of sets of upper and lower barriers. For example, if the asset price goes
over a high enough barrier then the model sells the asset, assuming that it is an
optimally high value and the asset values will probably decrease in the future.
We calculate the predicted illiquidity costs for investing with money managers
for 6 years starting 12/2013.
Our computed (yearly) illiquidity premiums for money managers investing
in the following classes of assets are: Domestic Equity 1.47% (2 year lockup),
Foreign Equity 2.42% (2 year lockup), Fixed Income 2.69% (2 year lockup), Ab-
solute Return 2.82% (2 year lockup) and Private Equity 1.87% (6 year lockup).
For our further analysis we will pick only the last two assets. For around 20,000
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Monte Carlo simulations, our illiquidity premium values were converging with
accuracy 0.0002 and for 40,000 Monte Carlo simulations the outputs were con-
verging with accuracy 0.00002. Performing 100,000 simulations the predicted
illiquidity premium values for the Hedge Funds with illiquidity period 2 years
were: 2.45% annually, for Private Equity with illiquidity period 6 years: 1.85%
annually and for the period 2 years: 2.58% annually.
Correlation and Expected Return Analysis
Figure 4.2 shows the average of the correlation matrix that was used in our
simulations. The scale goes from dark red to white to green to represent positive
correlation, no correlation and inverse correlation, respectively. As expected,
we see high correlation among hedge fund returns and little correlation among
cash, fixed income asset classes. Private Equity is somewhat equally correlated
with others, while Real Estate is the least correlated with others among illiquid
asset classes.
Figure 4.2: Average Correlation Matrix for 2002-2014
For comparison, let us look on the correlation matrix from 2008-2010. The
matrix is shown in Figure 4.3. It’s largely the same as the full period correla-
tion matrix. However, on average, all asset classes are slightly more correlated
among each other and cash is more negatively correlated with all asset classes.
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This confirms that the asset classes tend to correlate more during crisis than dur-
ing normal markets. This knowledge may be useful to an investor who is trying
to hedge their risk in the future.
Figure 4.3: Average Correlation Matrix for 2008-2010
Figure 4.4: Average Mean and Standard Deviation of Each Asset Class
During Two Periods
In addition, we look at the expected return and standard deviation of each
asset class during the full period and financial crisis. Many studies indicate that
during financial crises or times of high volatility, correlations between assets
generally increase (see for example [38], [39], [40] and [41]). To address that
issue, we assess the sensitivity of our illiquidity premium depending on the
correlations and mean returns of our assets.
Next, we see how sensitive our computed illiquidity premiums are while
scaling the underlying correlation matrix. Except the entries on the diagonal,
we scale the correlation entries and make them artificially smaller or higher. A
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problem one might encounter in scaling the values of correlation matrix is that
after the changes it might not be positive-semidefinite anymore. To solve the
latter problem we are using the Alternating Projections Algorithm to find the
nearest positive semidefinite matrix as described in Higham (2002) [42].
The results (see Figure 4.5) indicate that when all the asset classes (including
the interest rates) become more (less) correlated, the values of our computed
illiquidity premiums do not change much. So, our model is quite robust. But,
the graphs also indicate that while the correlations increase, the illiquidity pre-
mium also has a positive dynamics. During crises the returns of all asset classes
(except the riskless one) also decrease. We analyzed how the change in the ex-
pected returns affect the illiquidity premium (see Figure 4.6).
Figure 4.5: Scaling the Correlation Matrix
One can see that there is a positive correlation between the expected re-
turns and the illiquidity premium. When we scale the expected returns up,
the illiquidity premium also increases. For the Hedge Fund class in particular,
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Figure 4.6: Scaling the Mean of the Expected Returns
this result confirms the findings of Bali, Gockan and Liang (2007) [21] , Acker-
man, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) [22] and Liang(1999) [23], that the Hedge
Funds with more illiquidity (longer lockup restrictions) have higher expected
returns.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
In the first part of this work, I introduced theoretical definitions to describe two
type of factors: Attention (ones that guide investor’s attention towards a subset
of stocks) and Action (ones that could be the triggers of the trading actions).
After creating a framework to quantify various input and output information,
I presented a model which enabled us to combine the Buy/Sell trading signals
of a given fund. The implementation of the model on the US Mutual Fund
data confirmed the existence of the previously hypothesized Attention/Action
factors. I found that factors such as turn or size are often used to direct the in-
vestor’s attention towards a subset of stocks. However, other factors such as 3
or 6 month momentum, throughout the last 25 years, remain the main reason
of a trading action of a fund. Surprisingly, the factors bm, pcf or ptb, although
being widely used by the Value Investors, are used only by 3% of the funds as
triggers for their trading actions. Using cluster analysis, we saw that a fund’s
preference towards one factor might vary depending on the values of the other
factors. By extending the methodology of finding the trading preferences of a
fund towards 1 factor, I introduced the ”Preference Directionality Map”. The
latter is used to find the preference of the fund’s Buy/Sell trading actions de-
pending on 2 or more factors. The implementation of the directionality map on
four sample US Mutual Funds demonstrated the similar patterns of preference
within the same investment philosophy.
The described methodology of determining the trading preferences of the
funds is fundamentally different from the commonly accepted empirical ap-
proaches of finding fund’s trading style based on the fund holdings. This is
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because the holdings-based trading style measures by Grinblatt et al. (1995)
and Daniel et al. (1997) were designed to address the question of the fund
performance rather than finding the Buy/Sell preferences in relation to various
sources of information. To the best of my knowledge, the described approach
is also fundamentally different from the other popular (empirical) models in
academia which extract mutual fund preferences (e.g. those by Falkenstein
(1996)1 or Bushee (1998, 2001) 2).
To better understand how to combine the ”preference directionality maps”
of multiple funds, I introduced the Action|Attention (A|A) model. Exploring
the A|A model, we saw that the previously constructed ”preference direction-
ality maps” were representing the expected amounts of a trading action in a
given factor region. After introducing the Preference and the Decision func-
tions, I was able to use the A|A model to predict the aggregate mutual fund sell
actions for 20-50% (depending on the chosen range of accuracy) of stocks3. In
the majority of the cases, the A|A model performed 2-3 times better than the
fund predictions made by the time-series predictors. The previous quarter sell
was the second best predictor. The latter confirms the finding of Sias (2004), that
the investor’s aggregate demand for a stock is similar in the adjacent quarters.
An important conclusion of this work is that the aggregate fund trading and
”herding” does not require funds to follow each other’s trading actions. Note
that the main assumption in the Action|Attention model actually was that the
funds do not copy each other’s trading decisions4. However, fitting the model
1The paper documents fund preferences towards stocks with low transaction costs by ana-
lyzing the mutual fund holdings for the year 1991 and 1992.
2Bushee (1998, 2001) classifies the US funds using empirical analysis as either dedicated,
transient or quasi-index fund.
3Within the stocks for which the A|A model produced a sell prediction.
4The reason of introducing such an assumption was to allow us to use the law of large num-
bers to predict aggregate fund actions.
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to the data produced solid predictions for the aggregate fund trades which were
better 5 than the ones produced by the previous quarter predictor. In contrast
to the conclusions of Sias (2004), we saw that a model where funds do not in-
tentionally follow each other’s trading actions can fit and predict the aggregate
US Mutual fund sales. Thus, the Action|Attention model provides important
evidence against the commonly used hypothesis, which states that the reason
why institutions herd is because they follow each other’s trading actions (see
models by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) or Scharfstein and Stein
(1990)). The alternative explanation of the aggregate fund trading patterns pro-
vided by the A|A model is that the herding is ”unintentional” because the funds
follow similar trading philosophies6. So, when a stock enters a region towards
which many funds have strong one-sided (i.e. either Buy or Sell) preferences
7, the probability of a one-sided trading action increases and ”herding” could
happen.
An important observation is that we do not have access to the complete input
information which a fund manager actually uses for trading. For example, if a
fund made a purchase based on a meeting of a company’s CEO with the share-
holders, that set of the information would not be included in our dataset. So, our
analysis would be about the relation of the public information with the fund’s
trading decisions. That public information might still not be free to access. But,
the main assumption of our model is that any fund, given the will to spend
the necessary resources, can access an information set, fairly. If a fund trades
5That is producing a larger percentage of predictions which are within the 25% and 50%
range of the actual aggregate fund sell actions. For example, for the 50% range of accuracy, in
the 96% of the cases the A|A predictor’s success rate was higher (for 34% of the cases at least
twice higher) than the one produced by the previous quarter predictor.
6That is, the funds have similar beliefs about stocks with which factor values could outper-
form the market.
7I call them the ”opinionated” regions.
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based on private or purely discretionary reasons, I expect the relation not to be
explainable by my analysis. Fortunately, with the introduction of the machine
learning tools, the amount of ”non-quantifiable” information decreases. Thus, I
hypothesize that the predictability of the low-cost fund trades would continue
to increase.
There are various possible improvements and further research options,
which remained outside of the scope of this work. For example, based on the
initial IVNM analysis, it is possible to increase the accuracy of the IVNM pre-
dictions by taking instead of V , the maximum or the minimum values of the
factors produced in a quarter. Another improvement could be to increase the
accuracy of the trading observations, by reverse-engineering the mutual fund
holdings from their daily return data.
Note that the aggregate fund predictions were targeted towards individual
stocks. A further analysis of stocks might show which stocks are more pre-
dictable and one could combine stocks in portfolios to decrease the variance
of the prediction. Lastly, the aggregate institutional trades are correlated with
the short-term stock price movements (see e.g. Wermers (1999) or Dasgupta,
Prat and Verardo (2011)). An interesting question would be to further analyze
the correlation of the predictions of the A|A model with short-term stock price
movements.
In the constraint reduction framework, I developed a theory to correctly
measure the costs of the portfolio constraints. My motivation was to under-
stand how to model the Hedge Fund lockups by treating them as re-balancing
restrictions. We saw that the value of the expected terminal utility function is
naturally smaller in the constrained setting. So, I proposed to penalize the ex-
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pected returns of the assets in the un-constrained model and, as a result, lower
the resulting terminal utility’s expected value. When it is possible to lower that
value to the level of the constrained model, we are able to define the premium
of a constraint. The approach was described in a general theoretical setting and
I demonstrated its use on a classical Merton Portfolio Construction example.
I argued that the hedge fund lockups should be modeled as a lost invest-
ment opportunity premium. The investment opportunities of the institutional
investors typically consist of investing through the asset managers. I modeled
lockups as an inability to rebalance investor’s portfolio into: a riskless asset,
another hedge fund class or another mutual fund. The lockup premium was
constructed in the transaction cost and Markov-Switching frameworks. Gener-
ally, implementing optimal portfolio construction model with transaction costs
might not be practical (Korn, 2004). However, we saw that by using the recent
advances in the approximate dynamic programming (Cai, Judd and Xu, 2013),
it is possible to calculate the hedge fund lockups in a transaction cost setting. I
also modeled the hedge fund lockups in a Markov-Switching framework, which
I argued to be a better representation of the Hedge Fund return process. Due
to the limitations on the data access, I only implemented the latter model on
a ”random” data set. However, it demonstrated the possibility to numerically
compute the lockup premium in the Markov-Switching framework. I conclude
that the modern numerical tools enable us to model hedge fund lockups in a
realistic setting.
Next, we simplified the lockup premium framework in order to apply it to
the data on hedge fund indexes (the one we had access to). We fitted a simplified
theoretical model to historic data and simulated asset price paths for the next
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6 years. This model produced lockup restriction illiquidity premium values for
different asset classes. Those values were typically between≈ 1.5−2.5%, yearly.
Thus, in some cases the implicit lockup premium is more than the standard
2% hedge fund management fee. So, we conclude that the hedge fund lockup
premium values are significant and need to be considered by a sophisticated
institutional investor to choose between hedge funds and lower cost funds.
Scaling the input correlation matrix indicates that our model is robust with
respect to collective changes of the correlations of the assets. Our results also
indicate that the the higher the expected returns of the asset, the more illiquidity
premium it gets because of the share restrictions. For specific case of hedge
funds, our results support the findings of Bali, Gockan and Liang (2007) [21] ,
Ackerman, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) [22] and Liang(1999) [23].
An obvious extension of this work would be to apply the models to actual
Hedge Fund return data and compute the lockup premiums. Note that the pro-
posed approach measured the illiquidity premium of the hedge fund lockups
independent from the portfolio construction model of the institutional investor.
So, the approach is mainly limited to the cases when the aim is to estimate an
absolute measure of the illiquidity premium. If the optimal portfolio construc-
tion strategy of the institutional investor is known, the lockup premium should
be calculated based on the that strategy. The reason is that the illiquidity pre-
mium heavily depends on how efficient the portfolio construction model of the
investor is (Gushchin, Trikoz and Verdiyan (2014)). In particular, the hedge fund
lockups could even be beneficial by protecting an inexperienced investor from
market timing mistakes and fire sales.
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